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ABSTRACT
The study is expected to help to recognize that in modem international competition in
emerging markets, companies compete with global strategies involving not only costs or markets
but also the building of strategic competitive advantage for both the foreign firms and the hosting
counties. The study goes beyond costs and markets and explains why some companies are better
than others at creating dynamic and evolving competitiveness based on the corporate and the
national policies and strategies, from product innovation, technology transfer to economic
development as well. The case study of Motorola Inc. in China's telecommunications and
electronics industries serves this purpose as an empirical base.
China's remarkable economic progress has led multinational corporation, Motorola,
already operating there revise radically its view of the country's opportunities and redouble its
efforts to capitalize on its potential. The company is not merely in China to take advantage of its
low labor costs and then jump to another country when development inexorably drives those costs
up. The company is holding ground in this emerging market for the long haul by fitting corporate
globalization strategy into China's strategic development policies.
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Introduction
Objective and Central Theme of the Study
For the past two decades, as technologies, markets and economies are getting globalized,
many multinational companies from industrialized world have been moving overseas. Among the
various emerging markets in Asia, East Europe, and Latin America, China has witnessed a new
wave of international competition based on not only labor costs and markets but also on
technology and capital. Some players succeeded and the others failed. Why are some firms better
than others at building and sustaining competitive advantage? What accounts for their success?
Motorola is one of the world's leading providers of wireless communications,
semiconductors and advanced electronic systems and services. Motorola maintains sales, services
and manufacturing facilities throughout the world, conducts business on six continents and
employs more than 142,000 people worldwide now. As an electronic communication pioneer,
Motorola sells about 45 percent of the world's cellular phones and an overwhelming 85 percent of
pagers. Motorola also commands a very respectable third-place showing among the world's
manufacturers of semiconductors. Now over half of its sales are made outside the United States.
Continuing globalization at Motorola focuses on Asian, Eastern European, and Latin American
markets in the early 1990's. In 1993, the company established Corporate America's biggest
manufacturing venture in China: two plants for the manufacture of simple integrated circuits,
pagers, and cellular phones. In 1995, Motorola built another joint venture with China's biggest
electronic manufacturer, Panda Electronics Group, to produce and distribute systems compatible
with Mac OS systems in China.
The story of Motorola's communication business is a success of American
competitiveness. Subject to the same global competitive pressures that overwhelmed the US
consumer electronics industry faced with rivalry from the likes of NEC and Matsushita, Motorola
stands as not only the sole surviving major US manufacturer in the markets but as the world's
leader.
On the other side, for the past decade, China, with the world's fastest economic growth
rate, has not only been forming an emerging market and providing cheap labor, but also been
building its own knowledge base through selective international collaborations to catch up new
technology express. China has been developed and is continuing developing its strategic policies
of industrialization, especially in some key industries such as electronics, telecommunications and
computer/information industries. Injecting foreign technology is important, but how to transfer it
into the nation's competitive advantages is more crucial to China, as a late-comer. What and how
does China develop its competitive industrial policies in the context of international collaborations
and competition?
Considering the two sides, how can a US firm's global strategy fit into China's industrial
policy to achieve a win-win end?
This empirical study is designed to understand the issue above-mentioned by exploring
how the multinational high-tech giant, Motorola, has successfully built its leadership in China
emerging markets on a wide variety of technology-intensive bases and how China has been
developing its technological competitiveness by collaborating with and learning from foreigners.
In this study, I will analyze the corporate strategies of Motorola and industrial
development policies of China, placing Motorola and China's communications/electronics
industry in the historical and international context, especially in the new techno-economic regime
of emerging markets. The circumstances under which "developmental" foreign subsidiaries may
emerge in host regions will be reviewed and possible routes to cluster formation and the
generation of dynamic competitive advantage in the industries will be explored.
Literature Review
Why are some firms like Motorola more adept than others at competing on the basis of
technology in global, especially in emerging markets? How does a nation, especially a developing
country, build its competitive advantage through learning and collaborating with foreign partners.
To seek explanations, many theoretical insights have been derived from the literature in political
economy, industrial studies, economic geography, and business strategy and management.
Contemporary scholarship offers two broad explanation for differences among firms and
nations in their ability to make effective use if technology. One focuses on factors external to the
firm, such as macroeconomics conditions, government policy, and industry structure, and helps
account for cross-national variations. The other, which focuses on internal variables, maintains
that if firms vary in their ability to exploit technology, the reasons have to do with how they
manage R&D, engineering, and manufacturing. A new direction is to the consideration of the role
of general management.
Traditional industrial theory such as location theory, as developed by such pioneers as
Alfred Webber (Webber, 1929) and Edgar Hoover (Hoover, 1948), relied heavily on the pulls of
factors of production such as materials, markets and labor supplies, reinforced by economies of
agglomeration. Product cycle-profit cycle theory maintains that as domestic market saturation is
reached, in search for lower-cost production, the big monopolistic company will tend to desert the
original center of production for other locations--in other regions, and even in other countries--
where costs, especially of labor, are lower. Ann Markusen, Peter Hall, and Amy Glasmeier
(1986), in their book "High Tech America", argue that some elements-business climate and
scientific research--appear especially important for an understanding high tech location.
Increasingly, corporations must compete globally. Global strategies involve not only
selling worldwide but also producing and even conducting research in more than one location. It
is essential for a company to understanding the structure of its industry and position itself to gain
a sustainable competitive advantage. The most comprehensive framework for analyzing the
myriad external conditions that influence a firm's ability to compete in technology-intensive,
global markets is provided by Michael Porter in "The Competitive Advantage of Nations". How
companies succeed in international markets? Companies achieve competitive advantage through
acts of innovation. Why are companies able to overcome the substantial barriers to change and
innovation that so often accompany success? The answer lies in four broad attributes of a nation,
attributes that individually and as system constitute the diamond of national advantage, the playing
field that each nation establishes and operates for its industries. Porter describes four
interdependent clusters of external conditions: "factor conditions", the richness of a nation's
endowments in what economists call factors of production--human resources, physical resources,
knowledge resources, capital resources, and infrastructure; "demand conditions", the
sophistication, size, and nature of the domestic market for a firm's production; "related and
supporting industries", the competitive strength of the network of domestic firms that supply or
complement the firm; and "firm strategy, structure, and rivalry", patterns of managerial practice,
industrial structure and inter-firm rivalry that are characteristic of the nation in which the firm is
based.
When study international markets, classical economists have emphasized macroeconomics
variables, including interest rates, currency values, natural resources, and labor pools--all of which
are quite beyond the ability of an individual firm or industry to control. The adequacy of this view
has been decisively challenged. "The Competitive Advantage of Nations" argues that national
prosperity can be created and is not merely a result of inherited endowments. In fact, for
competing in sophisticated industries, the factor condition that matter the most are those a nation
develop such as specialized human resources or specific scientific know-how. These factors,
together with demanding local buyers, a sophisticated supplier network, and intense domestic
rivalry, are the conditions that spawn successful global competitors.
Some scholars have been looking at the issue from the other direction--the emergence of
consumer markets or consumer society in Asia. According to Hussey (1991)', the value to be
added to the economies of Asia in the 1990's has been estimated at US$ 2.5 trillion--the same as
that to be added to the American-Canadian and European Community economies combined in the
same period. It is estimated that by 2000 there will be some 80 million high net worth consumers
in Asia compared with some 10 million in North America with similar levels of assets and
earnings. With increased wealth the consumer boom has led to a consumer culture which is based
on material values--having and displaying what the market rather than the individual perceives to
be the best or the most fashionable. Sophisticated consumer behavior is developed through
education and experience. The wealth consumers, being able to travel, tend to develop similar
tastes whatever their nationality. Spending patterns are very similar among the affluent in Europe,
North America and Asia. Major corporations in North America and Europe realized during the
1980's or even earlier in the 1970's that they could no longer be successful in concentrating
principally on their domestic markets and treating their international ones as less important.
Therefore they gave increasing attention to their international operations. The factors driving
them into this situation have been described by Ohmae (1985). He theorized that Japan, Europe
and the US formed a Triad, presenting the most important strategic battlefield for companies
operating on a global scale. In order to be successful, manufacturing companies have to invest
1 Hussey, in "International Review of Strategic Management" provides detailed data.
extensively in tow activities: automation and R&D. Such companies have to move upstream to
obtain access to new technology and downstream to improve the efficiency of their distribution.
Multinational manufacturers, having invested heavily in automated equipment and R&D,
need to have access to affluent consumers at the same time in the different markets in which they
are located since one nation market alone may have insufficient capacity for the multinational to
recover its capital cost. With heavily investment in automation, R&D and more customer
orientation, the products of the competing major multinationals tend to become increasingly
similar in nature and content, requiring similar skill levels of product users. Differentiation comes
more from packaging than from content. No multinational can keep an innovative advantage for
long since lead times to bring in either competing products or clones are very short. The factors
which will determine superiority are: 1) investment in automated equipment, 2) customer
awareness, 3) emphasis given to R&D, 4) access to all major international markets, and 5)
location of plants and ability to deliver. Asia is displaying all the signs of increasing affluence
which result in consumer spending conforming with international patterns. This process will
gather momentum in the 1990s. In order to service this market effectively, the multinational
companies which wish to have a significant share of Asian markets will have to have a
correspondingly significant presence in Asia. For American and European companies the
temptation will be to develop distribution channels only into which product is shipped from other
parts of the world.
There is a growing consensus that the fundamental weakness in the US economy comes
from the difficulties of its manufacturing sector. This at a time when a new techno-economic
paradigm is emerging based on new technologies that have internationalized production processes
and globalized markets for products. Diwan and Chakraborty's book "High Technology and
International Competitiveness" (1991) makes the first attempt to analyze the various dimensions
of high technology's production structure and growth: productivity, input substitution, and
technological change. The book provides the first empirical results on productivity and technical
change in the high-technological sector. They found that capital and skilled labor are complements
and technological change is non-neutral and embodied in inputs. One of the major conclusions is
that labor in this sector is not a cost but an asset. This is a radical conclusion.
According to Diwan and Chakraborty, in the emerging new technology regime, it is the
high technology that have growth potential in the future, and over time they will become a larger
and more important part of any competitive economy. Since the new technology regime is
international in character and fosters global markets, the high technologies have to compete
internationally. It is high technologies that provide international competitive strength to an
economy.
In addition, cost reduction and enlarged markets together provide the necessary condition
for a self-propagating process. The sufficient condition is that social-economic institutions must
also be consistent with this process. Institutional framework, in this context, embraces a very
large spectrum containing a wide variety of institutions: economic, international, national political,
and social. A new techno-economic paradigm is in place, one that is international in character and
based fundamentally on microelectronics, or information-based, technologies. This paradigm is
based, in an essential way, on (1) scientific knowledge, (2) skill and experience of the work force.
(3) capital costs, and (4) location advantages.
Finally, Morone (1991) in "Winning in High-tech Markets" analyzed this issue, focusing
on the role that have internal management plays in building and sustaining advantage on the basis
of technology. The answer lies primarily with the behavior and practices of general management--
the people with profit and loss responsibility who set the tone, objectives, and directions of the
firm. Specifically, the analysis is pursued from three perspectives: general management's business
strategies, technologies for implementing those business strategies, and the decision-making style
underlying the formulation and implementation of business and technology strategies. They
conclude that if very different US businesses are succeeding in markets where many others are
having a hard time competing, the managerial practices of those businesses are the most likely
source of their success and that successful decision makers exhibit an underlying strategy of
"learning from experience" or "learning by doing."
Design of the Study and the Structure of the Thesis
Quite a number of books and papers have been written on the subject of Sino-foreign joint
ventures and a few papers on technology transfer to China. However, little attention has been paid
to the particular issue of dynamic relationship between multinational high-tech companies and the
hosting government policies in building competitive advantages for both the foreign companies
and hosting country. This study will be structured around the following three basic categories of
questions.
What? What are the unique features of Motorola's China strategy? What are the goals
and objectives of China's strategic development policies in the process of industrialization,
specifically the policies in communications/electronics industries? What are the forms and
fields in which Motorola and China have been collaborating? What are the characteristics
of their relationship?
How? How are the collaborations organized and performing? How have Motorola's
strategies and China's industrial policies evolved over the time in the collaboration and
how do they influence with each other? In the face of uncertainty, how have Motorola
management gone about evaluating new product and business opportunities? How and why
have they decided to pursue some opportunities and forgo others?
Why? Why have the collaborations between Motorola and China been successful so far?
Should some lessons be learned from Motorola and China's experiences? Why do some
nations provide an environment that enable companies to improve and innovate faster than
foreign rivals? Can we identify attributes of foreign technology and business strategy that
tend to be associated with favorable industrial policy of a developing country?
To address these questions, this study has been based on an empirical analysis of
Motorola's China strategies and China's industrial policies, practices and outcomes in their
collaborations. This has involved two-level field studies, with one focusing on strategy/policy
issues and the other on practices and outcomes. In the first effort, I have first collected and
analyzed historical/documentational information from Motorola Inc. and China's central
government's Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI) and Ministry of Postal and
Telecommunications (MPT). For the second , I have collected and analyzed relevant data and
information from Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd., which is in charge of manufacturing,
distribution, sales, and R&D in China's various sites.
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I China: Prepare for the 21st Century (Chapter
1-2). In Chapter 1, I present a brief history review of China's economic reform and development
policy evolution in the 1980's and 1990's. In particular, presented are the China's strategic
industrial development policies in three key industries, namely telecommunications, electronics,
and computers. Part II Motorola: Road to Globalization Chapter 4-6). In this section, I first
provide a review of Motorola's corporate history and business profile, focusing on its historical
evolution, corporate culture, and globalization strategy targeting Asian emerging high-tech
markets. Then I extend the company analysis to its cornerstones and core technological
competencies. Part III Motorola-China: Win-win Success (Chapter 7-10). In Chapter 7,
Motorola's business strategies and achievements since mid-1980's to date are presented. Chapter
8 focuses on the analysis of the dynamic strategic relationship between Motorola and China's
governments and industries. In Chapter 9, some important implications of Motorola's China
experiences and the commonplaces of successful China business practices are drawn. And finally,
the Chapter 10 provides some future perspectives on China's future development in its
industrialization process and challenges and problems faced by Motorola for the years coming
ahead. The thesis concludes that in modem international competition in emerging markets,
companies compete with global strategies involving not only costs or markets but also the
building of strategic competitive advantage for both the foreign firms and the hosting counties,
and that these companies are holding ground in this emerging market for the long haul by fitting
corporate globalization strategy into China's strategic development policies.
China: Prepare for the 21st Century
Chapter 1 China's Economic Reform and Development Strategies in the
1980's-1990's
1.1 An Overview: The Rising Giant in the East
The end of 1970's marked a significant change in China's economic strategy from central
planning to "Reform and Open-door". Since then, China has been on its way of a unprecedented
"New Long March" to the prosperity--the nation, with one quarter of the world's population, has
dedicated itself to economic development and has shown its great development potential. Entering
the 1990's, the nation achieved the fastest growth rate in the world and the exports has also
increased greatly, as shown in Exhibit 1-1 and 1-2.
Exhibit 1-1. China's GDP (1991-2000)
Unit: Billions of US$
Year GDP
1991 390
1992 450
1993 520
1994 580
1995 700
1996 730 EST
2000 990 EST
Source: China's State Statistical Bureau
* At 1996 exchange-rate value of China's currency
Exhibit 1-2. China's Exports (1991-2000)
Unit: Billions of US$
Year_ Exports
1991 75
1992 80
1993 90
1994 120
1995 155
1996 170 EST
2000 200 EST
Source: China's State Statistical Bureau
* At 1996 exchange-rate value of China's currency
Part I
China's fast growth created tremendous opportunities for global businesses and foreign
investments in China. The foreign direct investment (FDI) reached US$ 11.1 billion in 1992, US$
25.7 billion in 1993 and US$ 35 billion in 1994, which lead to the total US$ 140 billion FDI in
China from 1978 to 1994, the total 220 thousand of foreign investment projects and 100 thousand
of foreign wholly owned ventures or joint ventures in China. In 1995, the China's vice premier Li
Lanqing announced some of the ambitious development plans at the turning of the century: within
the last five years of the century, the total import will reach US$ 1,000 billion; in the year of 2000,
the annual import and export will total US$ 400 billion; from 1995, China will increase electric
power 15 billion kw annually; to the end of the century, China will have increased 16 thousand
km-long railway and 200 thousand-long highway; and in total, the investment in infrastructure
including telecommunication, aviation, ports will have exceeded US$ 1000 billion in 15 years.
(Engardio, 1996)
In particular, China, with its domestic base and wealth of engineering talent, plans to
become a world power in a host of industries, including telecommunications, electronics,
semiconductors, and computers.
1.2 Development Philosophy
So far, tremendous efforts by Western and Chinese scholarship have been put in
exploration of China's economic achievements and future directions, with different perspectives
and predictions, with mixed message from China's experience. To gain an appropriate long-range
view, it is helpful to look at philosophy of the Chinese reform from three perspectives:
development, history and culture, and political economy.
Development Chinese society has been in the midst of multiple and incomplete transition with
such characteristics as (a) shift in economic vision from a Stalinist command economy to a
market-oriented economy; (b) shift in business systems from an amorphous personalistic system
glued together by "guanxi"(personal mutual obligation) to a modern system of transparent rules
and regulations; and (c) shift in political control to the lawful civil society not under the thumb of
the Party-Sate apparatus.
History and Culture There are four key problems of history and culture that still impinge on
China's development. These are (a) rule--how to rule a large country with a large population from
a single place: tight central control or a diffusion of power? (b) greatness--how to restore China's
greatness: what will make China strong again? (c) transformation--how to transform Chinese
society: what road should China follow? and (d) foreign relations--how to deal with the outside
world: engagement or isolation?
Political Economy The struggles over transformation highlights the ranges of options faced by
Chinese policy-makers: (a) organization--how should the economy be organized and how much
centralization of decision making is desirable? (b) human resources--in an egalitarian society, how
should latent and education be recognized and rewarded? or is loyal political consciousness more
important than experience? (c) management--what are the appropriate roles of the Party and the
State? (d) investment balance--how should scarce capital be allocated: to heavy industry, light
industry, services, or agriculture? and (e) the proper role of the foreign sector--questions about
engagement with the world market.
The answers to these policy questions challenge the value of Chinese leaders. They also
affect transitional issues. Reform and development depend on the answers attempted for the
restoration of China's greatness and the transformation of her society. All Chinese leaders are
driven by the historical memory of the "century of humiliation" of treaty ports and gun-boat
diplomacy--the outcome of the disastrous collision of the declining Qing dynasty, riddled with
corruption and burdened with a huge increase in population, with Western imperialism, fired by
the revolutionary ideologies of free trade, Social Darwinism, and evangelical Christianity. Since
the "Self-Strengtheners" of the mid-nineteenth century, the Chinese have been united in restoring
China's position in the world, but have been bitterly divided over how to achieve it. How to
transform Chinese society has been at the center of these conflicts. Which road should China
follow? There have been many options, ranging from nineteenth century attempts at imperial
restoration and constitutional monarchy through Sun Yatsen's guided republicanism and Jiang
Jieshi's fascism to Mao Zedong's various solutions--"new democracy", "Sino-field" Stalinism,
Cultural Revolution enthusiasm--and Den Xiaoping's "socialist market economy". Despite the
vast differences between these solutions, these us a common thread: the attempt to graft new
practices onto older traditions. The Self-Strengtheners felt that they could simply utilize industrial
techniques to save the agriculturally-based Confucian order. Their slogan was "Zhong-xue wei ti,
xi-xue wei yong"--Chinese learning as the base, Western learning for use. But the contradiction
was too strong: industrialism is not "culture-free" but leads to great transformation. Societies are
complex systems--change one sector, and eventually all other sectors change as well, usually with
unintended consequences. The formulation "socialist market economy" contains the same basic
conflict--tight Leninist political control and markets. But economic choice builds pressures for
other freedoms. Finally, to question of dealing with the outside world, the answers have run
from isolation to engagement.
1.3 The Role of Technology
"A new technological revolution is currently taking place in the new world. this presents
both an opportunity and a challenge to the economic development of our country. We
should seize this opportunity and make selective use of the new scientific and
technological achievements as to accelerate our modernization and narrow the economic
and technological gap between China and the developed countries."
-- CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, 1984
Technology is probably the most important element in China's four modernization plans--
agriculture, industry, technology and defense, formally announced in 1978. Since then, the
Chinese leadership have paid increasing attention to the critical role of science and technology for
advancing their country's economy.
Particular concerns have been what China's response should be to the growing importance
of four key technologies in the economic, social, and military affairs of the industrialized nations--
microelectronics, information technology, biotechnology, and new materials. The Chinese leaders
have realized that unless China is able to make significant advances in the fours above-noted
areas, the technological gap between China and the West will grow even wider in the future. In
fact, the emphasis on the "third wave" technologies has sparked a lively debate among members
of the science and technology community regarding whether China should move faster in
attempting to catch up with advanced country technology levels or abide by its present goal to
attain Western technology levels of the 1970's and the 1980's by the year 2000.
It has been obvious to the Chinese government that technology is particularly important
element of modernization in the various derivative industries made possible by microelectronics.
Highly demanded consumer products in China such as TV are often embedded with Integrated
Circuits (ICs) technology. As quality and precision are becoming critical in the international
market place, China can no longer resort to the job shop kind of production mechanism. process
automation in both heavy and light industries are essential to upgrade quality, to improve
productivity and to conserve energy. For a vast country like China, manual processing of
transaction and management information is terribly ineffective. More accurate information is
necessary for sound central planning. The need for new high technology is particularly acute in a
planned economy, where much data collection, aggregation and distribution are necessary.
information technology appears to be the key component in modernizing the infrastructure of
China: telecommunications, transportation, utilities and banking. Electronics technology,
therefore, has been ranked top in the development priority of China's recent three consecutive
Seven Five-Year Plans (1986-2000).
China has been attempting to build a comprehensive capability of information technology
in most areas of applications. To reach that goal, China has given priority to a wide spectrum of
high leveragable technologies or those China is weak in.
China has recognized its needs for foreign technology for the short and intermediate term.
The question was not so much to make or buy, but what, from whom, and through what channels
to buy. China has been keen on establishing joint ventures with foreigners because of several
advantages: shared capital exposure, comprehensive contacts with foreign technology and
management know how, credibility in international market, and the alignment of the foreign
partner's interest to the ongoing success of the joint venture. The emphasis on know-how was
designed to reduce potential long-term dependency on foreign sources and promote China's goal
greater technological self-reliance.
Traditional technology transfer literature painted the picture of huge MNCs exploiting
helpless developing countries. As many MNCs hold the key technologies essential to the growth
of Third World countries, they have been imposing stringent terms on the transfer of technology
to developing countries, often extracting exorbitant profits, or hoarding essential technical know-
how. This bleak picture may well be true for the typical developing countries whose economic
growth is at the mercy of giant MNCs. This, however, is not true for China. In fact, China is
known as a tough negotiator, imposing demanding terms on foreign companies attempting to
establish a presence there. China's bargaining power with the suppliers of technology is two fold,
its size and its centralized government. Whereas some MNCs are reluctant to enter the dubious
market of a small sized developing country, Western corporations are flocking heads over heels to
conduct business in China. The vast market of one billion people, a quarter of the world
population, is the dream of any marketer. While China's huge supply of cheap labor force might
be an incentive, it has been becoming less attractive with the increasing popularity of automation.
Before China's foreign trade is decentralized recently, all business transactions has to go through
several gateways. These gateways monopolize the access to the vast market. The government
bureaucracy becomes one of the most powerful buyers in the world by virtue of the sheer size
they represent. China has waved the carrots of government contracts and a potentially huge China
market to encourage foreigners to share their technology.
The Chinese approach to development of enhanced capabilities in computers and
electronics has been premised on a two-pronged strategy that combines direct support for
technical advance through larger investments in R&D and plant renovation with a well targeted
foreign acquisition effort. the Chinese have targeted large-scale integrated circuit technology as
their major electronics priority. Chinese efforts, however, are not merely focused on foreign
acquisitions; there are very large on-going R&D programs underway throughout China's
electronics industry to upgrade domestic capabilities. China is also expanding its efforts in
software development.
1.4 Technology Transfer: Chinese Experience
"The main purpose of our policy of opening to the world is to import advanced
foreign technology and managerial expertise and attract funds. In doing so, our
ultimate aim is to improve the quality of our own products, to increase our
capacity for self-reliance, and to speed up China's modernization."
-- Vice Premier Tian Jiyun, January 6, 1986
Essentially, China remains committed to the principle of achieving greater technological
self-reliance. As such, any effort to understand the role and contribution of foreign technology
must be made within the context of assessing on-going indigenous programs designed to enhance
domestic capabilities.
Over the years, China has made a available a variety of channels, ranging from wholly-
owned subsidiaries to licensing, for attracting the inflow of foreign technology. Among the
various channels for absorbing foreign technology, the Chinese government has a strong
preference for joint ventures which has thus become a major vehicle for foreign investors to
transfer their technology to China.
During the initial years of the economic reform, China would like to maintain a tight
control over incoming foreign investment, although the control seems to have been relaxed
gradually when demanded by foreign investors. The control was necessary for the central planning
of the economy and for upholding the socialist ideology. Laws governing wholly foreign-owned
enterprises were promulgated only in 1986, eight years after the start of the reform. At that time,
the Chinese government had already gained rich experience in handling foreign investment and so
was more confident in her ability to direct these foreign subsidiaries. During the past one or two
years, the number of foreign subsidiaries has been increasing, but is still far behind that of joint
ventures. Joint ventures appear to be the best candidate for the acquisition of technology in the
Chinese context.
As the 'open-door' policy introduced more flexibility into foreign business transactions,
China became increasingly interested in the more cost-effective option of purchasing know-how
separate from equipment. Chinese end-users became more careful in managing project costs when
they were made to take over some aspects of the financial responsibility for technology transfer.
By mid-1991, China had, by signing contracts to import new technology and equipment,
introduced into the country more than 4,000 items of technological transfer, with a value totaling
over US$ 25 billion. China's technology buying patterns have shifted to software and know-how
from hardware and turn-key projects. Before 1978 the import of "pure" technology to China
comprised only 2.3% of total imports, and import of equipment 90%, but by the mid-1980's the
former had already exceeded 50% while the latter fell below 50%2.
These technology strategies have paid off handsomely. To date, China is one of the
world's largest production bases not just for television sets, but also for consumer-electronics
appliances such as videocassette recorders and stereo systems. Much of that production is done
under foreign brands, particularly that of Japanese manufacturers. But Chinese and joint venture
brand names are now commonly found on domestic store shelves as inexpensive alternatives to
foreign brands.
2 Statistics are adapted from China Statistics Year Book, Beijing, China Statistical Publishing House, various
years.
Similarly, China's leading state-backed personal-computer makers are rapidly climbing the
technology ladder. Once limited to making PC components such as motherboards, several
companies are moving into the fast-growing domestic PC market, thanks in part to assistance
from their joint-venture partners.
In telecommunications, domestic Chinese companies are producing just under half of the
switching equipment necessary to handle the 15 million phone lines being installed domestically
every year. Joint ventures with foreign companies supply most high-end, central-office switches.
But Chinese companies control the low end of the market.
In recent years, China has also been becoming a major source of technology because of its
tremendous pool of first-rate scientists and engineers in high-tech industries. In many fields of
technology, the gap between China and the industrialized nations is narrowing. In fact, since the
mid-1980's China has licensed exports of more than 700 high-technology items totaling US$ 2.4
billion in hard currency earnings.3 Many inexpressive Chinese technologies have improved to a
level where they now challenge the level of Western technology in certain industries.
Talking about the technology transfer, especially the high-tech transfer, it is necessary to
mention the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control (COCOM). As China is a
Communist nation, certain COCOM and the US rules with regard to technology export control
should be understood. In the past, a major constraint has been the export control system and
COCOM, both of which served to restrict the sale of advanced technology to China. With the end
of Cold War, there has been general consensus that many of these restrictions should be
significantly relaxed. In accordance with this consensus, the US has taken several major steps to
loosen its previous controls. In fact, ever since the US recognized China in 1979, Beijing has
pressed the US to move forward in lifting restrictions on the sale of advanced technology. China
was eventually moved to the less sensitive "Group V", with technology transfers being denied
only if they would demonstrably contribute to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, long-
range bombers, antisubmarine warfare, electronic warfare and intelligence gathering. In short,
advanced military technologies were to be strictly restricted, but many of the building-block
technologies that the Chinese may use for military purposes, such as advanced materials and
3 Statistics are adapted from China Statistics Year Book, Beijing, China Statistical Publishing House, various
years.
electronics, could be exported. The relax of COCOM constraints somehow cleared the road for
foreign technology transfer to China.
Chapter 2 The Evolution of China's Key Industrial Policies
2.1 Telecommunications
Telecommunications has been increasingly recognized as a key component in the
infrastructure of economic development, yet for many years, telecommunication services in most
developing countries including China fell far short of needs. The result is that development is
constrained significantly throughout these economies.
Telecom Development in China
Despite the government's recognition of the strategic importance of telecommunications
and the high growth rate in the sector, China still has one of the least developed telecom systems
in Asia. With a telephone penetration rate of less than one in every 100 people in the 1980's and
less than two percent in the mid-1990's,4 China clearly has a lot of development work ahead.
Indeed, China's modernization plan is ambitious with the objective of increasing the
number of telephones in use five fold by the year 2000. It has been proposed to extend the trunk
network, further develop their satellite communications capacity and modernize the network with
further introduction of digitized switching equipment and wireless telecommunications systems as
well. Since the early 1990's, China's domestic long distance channels have been growing rapidly,
at about 16% annually over the past decade. The number of exchange lines in service in China at
the end of 1993 reached 30.48 million, making it one of the ten largest networks worldwide
(Hayes, 1994).
Despite the rapid development in recent years, however, there are millions homes waiting
for telephones in China's various places, cities and rural areas alike, with an average waiting
period of six months to one year. Long distance lines are scarce, connections rate are low, and
more than half of the country's villages and small towns do not have nay phones at all. (Cai,
1994)
Chinese government realizes the importance of the development of telecommunications.
Telecom has been given a high priority within every Five Year Plan since 1986. As shown in
Exhibit 2-1, by the year 2000, the government plans to reach a telephone density of 5-6%. Targets
4 See "China Industry Profile: Telecommunications Part 14". Business China. August 12, 1991: 119.
have also been set that double exchange capacity and toll trunk lines to 100 million and 1.4
million, respectively. To achieve these goals, the MPT will have to purchase over $10 billion
worth of switches and transmission equipment in 1995 and around $52 billion in infrastructure
between 1996 and 2000. (Zita, January 1995)
Exhibit 2-1 China : Public Telecom Network Expansion, 1985-2000.
1985 1990 1995 2000
Telephone lines 5,900,000 10,000,000 36,000,000 78,000,000**
Telephone density less 0.5% 1% 3% 5-6%**
Exchange capacity N/A 33,480,000 * 50,000,000 100,000,000**
Trunk Circuits 36,000 96,000 520,000 1,400,000**
% Digital 2% 79% 85%** 97%**
Sources: Adopted from Pyramid Research Estimates and China Official statistics, Eighth Five-Year plan (1990-
1995)
*1993 number
** Estimated number
The telecom revolution has reached China. In many Chinese cities, telephones, pagers,
cellular telephones, cable TV, satellites and even the Internet are gradually becoming a part of
everyday life.
In 1995, a year-old China United Telecom Co., or Lian Tong, began to offer telephone
services in four Chinese cities, breaking the monopoly on all services held by the MPT.
Competition, though limited, started emerging in China's telecom market for the first time in the
history.
Foreign investment and technology began entering China's telecom industry and
consumers too. Although China insisted on banning foreigners from owning or operating telecom
services, but allowed sales of equipment, joint venture manufacturing, consultancies and non-
equity investments. But recently, large foreign carriers have been aggressively pushing the limits
of the ban, creating equity-like deals with arrangements to build, operate and eventually transfer
the ownership of new networks to China.
Telecom System Structure
While China's telecom systems remain inadequate, it has been aggressively building
various telecom networks over the last decade. These include open wire network, coaxial cable
carrier network, submarine cable, microwave communications, special purpose communications,
as well as satellite communications. However, as of 1994, only 55% of the long distance traffic
was controlled by automatic switches, and only half was transmitted through microwave, modem
cable (including fiber optic), and satellite transmission networks. The remainder still went through
overheaded, open-wire lines (Bien, 1994). In many rural areas, the local networks were not
connected to the long-distance network. Instead, only one or two phones in the nearest town or
county post office are linked.
Wireless communications technologies appeared China's answer to technological
leapfrogging. Cellular phones and pagers have been in high demand in China. Despite China's
monumental efforts to upgrade its telecom infrastructure, the average customer could wait as long
as a year to have a phone installed, even in the larger cities. This situation led many of China's
budding entrepreneurs to turn to cellular communications equipment, which can be quickly
obtained by those with ready cash. Even though user fees and equipment costs for cellular service
were substantially higher than for ordinary telephone service, China's cellular networks had nearly
50,000 subscribers in more than 20 cities by mid-1992, a rapid increase from the 6,000-7,000 who
signed on when cellular services were first offered in 1987. (Holman, 1995) That number has
reached over 5 million by the mid of 1996. (China Daily, 1996)
Paging has been successful in China, not only because of the long wait lists for telephone
installation, but also because the main alternative, cellular telephone, costs anywhere from US$
1,150 to $1,750 (10,000-15,000 yuan) to purchase and register, more than ten times the cost of
pager. As a result, paging networks have also taken off in China, with an expansion from around
430,000 subscribers in 200 cities in 1990, to over one million subscribers in 400 cities in 1991, to
over 5.61 million by the end of 1993 (Bien and Pham, 1994) This technology was given an extra
boost when the market was officially opened in late 1993 to organizations not affiliated with the
MPT. Future demand for pagers is expected to keep rising.
In addition to the public telecom networks, China's had some other non-MPT national
telecommunications networks, namely "dedicated networks". Dedicated networks had an
important part of the national communications infrastructure since 1977. Among the operators of
specialized national networks were the Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Water Resources,
Ministry of Electronics, Ministry of Energy, Bank of China, New China News Agency, and the
peoples Liberation Army.
Institutional Framework
Before reform, China's state-owned telecom system was semi-military, highly centralized,
and basically a tool for administrative needs. Throughout all of this, telecom at the national level
was basically synonymous with the MPT.
The MPT is the central authority in charge of China's telecom sector. In addition to being
China's only public long distance carrier until very recently, the MPT also formulates and
overseas implementation of telecom policies, laws, plans, and reform programs; acts as the
regulatory agency; acts as a liaison between China's central bureaucracy and the 31 semi-
autonomous provincial carriers, and manages a large part of China's telecom equipment
manufacturing industries. The MPT is an umbrella government entity, which includes 31
provincial level Posts and Telecommunications Administrations (PTAs) and about 2,150 county
level PATs, with total 1,200,000 employees nationwide. (Liang and Zhu, 1994)
In addition to the MPT, a number of other central authorities also have some control over
certain telecom sector matters. These include some important ministries of the government such
as The State Planning Commission (SPC), The Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), The State
Science and Technology Commission (SSTC), The National Defense, Science, Technology, and
Industry Commission (NDSTI), and The Ministry of Finance (MOF).
The MPT's position as the single entity responsible for all telecommunications services has
lead to a great deal of inefficiency as different parts of the bureaucracy often interfere with each
other. Hence the government has recognized the need for establishing "an institutional structure
that clearly defines separate and distinct roles for policy-making, regulation, and management".
(Melody, 1991) Functional separation should not only improve policy making and regulations, but
also allow service enterprises to operate more efficiently. The MPT finally split itself nominally
into two parts in 1994. The MPT is now the national regulator, analogous to the FCC in the US,
while the Directorate General of telecommunications (DGT) becomes the dominant carrier
responsible for long distance, international, and national data networks.
Nevertheless, the MPT has been an active player in China's
telecommunications/information field. It enjoyed incredible growth and expansion has over the
past decade. Its efforts have greatly raised the telephone penetration rate in China. However, with
limited manpower and financial capacity, the MPT concentrates its major attention on the basic
universal telephone services.
The MEI is the highest government authority responsible for China's electronics industry,
to which many related industries including telecommunications and machinery formed a unique
and complicated institutional framework in the reform of China's information sector. The MEI has
been a constant advocator of digital technology and advanced services. This attitude is coincident
with its competitive advantages and expertise. The MEI has a strong R&D and manufacturing
base which covers electronic components, computer and software, and digital telecommunications
equipment. This kind of horizontal integration puts the MEI in an ideal position to harvest the
convergence of computer and communication technologies. Also, the MEI is in the area of
advanced information systems and services that the MEI is best equipped to compete with the
MPT. In addition, by promoting advanced information applications the MEI hopes to stimulate
and awaken the demand for services which the MPT is not currently interested in or able to
provide. The results may lead to pluralism and liberalization of the market, thus meeting a
precondition for the MEI to gain a stake in the services sector and realize upstream vertical
integration from product manufacturing into service operation.
Evolution of Telecom Reform and Industrial Policy
Form the beginning of the reform of telecom sector in China, the basic issue concerned by
the government was how developing countries such as China should go about restructuring the
sector. Is deregulation and competition the best way for these countries to upgrade their telecom
infrastructures, or should they rely on a monopolistic national telecom authority as South Korea,
Singapore, and Japan did? Should they follow the traditional path of playing down copper phone
wires, or should they use wireless networks in lieu of wireline? How to finance the restructuring
and development? And finally, to what extend should they allow foreigners play a role?
China's unique political and economic situation make the telecom policy arena very
different from that of many other developing countries. China's economy continues to grow at
double-digit rates, after being the world's fastest growing economy in the late 1980's, yet it is
also in transition from being a socialist to a market economy. Moreover, the state retains its
political authoritarianism; decisions are not made in the open, and the structure and policy-making
process behind Telecom are not fully understood. Nevertheless, some general trends and
directions of the reform and future development have been emerging.
Beginning of liberalization--breaking up of monopoly
The inadequacy of telecom services, together with reforms the state enterprises, fiscal, and
monetary structure of the 1990's, gave urgency to the need for a more developed
telecommunications sector. Partly out of these concerns came from the MPT's agreement in late
1993 to give up its monopoly position as the sole legal operator of public interprovincial voice
and data networks. Thus began the liberalization of the basic service market in
telecommunications, which was marked by the arrival of two new public entrants, Ji Tong and
Lian Tong, into the market. The MPT fought hard to retain its monopoly status but was
ultimately unable to prevail against the combination of political pressure and unmet demand for
services. Pressure for this move came largely from other ministries hoping to open up their own
private networks to the public. Liberalization was eventually achieved not only because of the
rivalry of government ministries but also because of the political clout of supporters of the new
companies, including the highest central government leaders.
Ji Tong Communications Corporation was founded by the central government in May
1993. With twenty-six different shareholders, it was China's largest communications equity
consortium. It was officially owned by the MEI. Ji Tong's stated mission from the government
was to develop a nationwide information infrastructure through its role as equipment supplier and
possible owner of the "Three Golden Projects".5
Meanwhile, the formation of Lian Tong, or China United Telecommunications
Corporation, indicated the most significant change in China's telecom history. Lian Tong became
the second long distance voice operator, the first time in China's telecom history. The existence of
Lian Tong was a reflection of the powerful interests that the potential value of
telecommunications services have attracted. Shareholders of Lian Tong include the three founding
ss "Three Golen Projects", China's national infornation technology initiatives, refer to "Golden Bridge" or "Jin
Qiao", as a national economic information network, "Golden Customs" or "Jin Guan", as a national foreign trade
and customs-related information network; and "Golden Card" or "Jin Ka", as a nationwide network of credit cards.
ministries--electronics industry, power and railways--and 16 other founding shareholders. Again,
the MEI was the primary catalyst behind the venture. But none of them were particularly
interested in Lian Tong itself. They were primarily attracted to the company's license, granted by
the State Council in December 1993, to operate a second telecom network. (Business China,
1995) According to Lian Tong's Chairman Zhao Weichen, by the year 2000, Lian Tong would
have 10% of China's long distance telephone traffic, 30% of all mobile traffic and its own
international service. Officially, Lian Tong's competing relation with the MPT was supposed to be
"competitive coordination." The terms of reference as stipulated by the State Council dictate that
Lian Tong should use the MOR and the MEP's redundant network capacity to provide voice,
data, radio, and cellular services to the public, concentrating primarily in areas where these
services do not exist or where those provided by the MPT are inadequate. The dynamics between
Lian Tong and the MPT are at the core of the changing nature of the telecommunications sector.
This state of play has had interesting consequences. At ministerial level the concerns are
about power and prestige as the MPT battles to maintain dominance over other ministries trying
to enter the telecom market. At a lower level the issues are not about power but revenue and
profits. Lian Tong gets its call through: the company will compete head on with the MPT and
other operators in trunk, local and mobile telephone services.
Adopting foreign technologies
Countries such as China in the Pacific Rim may be able to enter the "information society"
more quickly and efficiently than those in other regions because they are not hampered by as many
previous investments in outdated technology. To take advantage of this opportunity, however,
new communications technologies should be carefully chosen. New technologies should be cost
effective and practical, but also compatible with the needs, resources, and technical skills
available. Furthermore it is important to ask what effect technology transfer will have on the
relationship between developed and developing country. Developed countries may assist
developing countries by transferring technologies,
but they may also reinforce their own economic power or dominance by transferring only second-
rate technologies.
In China's telecom development, the primary needs are for quick diffusion of technologies
that can reach many people. Cost is an important consideration, as is more technical training for
rural telecom workers. Foreign investors are willing to transfer the latest technologies to China as
part of their businesses, but their transactions are constrained by government rules of both the
foreign countries and China. These restrictions are largely political.
Now China's telecom market is extremely competitive, this in part reflects the size and
potential of the market, but also reflects the tendency of governments of major companies in the
market to provide low interest loans (soft loans) to China in order to facilitate the purchase of a
particular company's equipment. The Japanese are particularly known for using this approach.
The highly competitive situation has also been encouraged by the Chinese government,
they have been prepared to operate their network with at least seven different telephone switching
systems when most modern networks operate within a maximum of two types of equipment. This
has allowed Chinese officials to play suppliers off against each other and has often enabled them
to obtain the consulting/technical advice needed as part of the equipment purchase package.
Major equipment suppliers currently in the market include C.I.T. Alcatel of France, AT&T. of the
US, Fujitsu Ltd. and NEC Corporation from Japan, International Telephone and Telegraph Co.'s
Belgium affiliate, Telefon A.B., L.M. Ericsson of Sweden and Northern Telecom from Canada.
(Forster, 1987)
The strategy for achieving this metamorphosis involves a massive investment of resources.
To relieve the strain on foreign currency reserves the government is looking towards joint
ventures with foreign corporations to develop the network and generate foreign exchange at the
same time. They have embarked on a course of decentralization giving provinces and local
telecommunications administrations responsibility for the efficient operation of the network.
The fast pace of telecom development in China has increased foreign competition to
supply the sector. Increasingly, foreign firms are seeking to invest in local production facilities to
ensure their positions over the long term. Foreign investors have been pressured by the MPT to
raise the proportion of local content in joint ventures--a mandate that extends to foreign licensing
arrangements as well. Current ministry guidelines call for production ventures, particularly those
that supply China's domestic market, to source at least 60-70 percent of all inputs
locally.(Gorham, 1993) Compliance with these guidelines has been greatest in ventures producing
PBX, key systems, multiplexes, fiber-optic transmission systems, and certain satellite and mobile
communications systems. Even for higher-technology items, such as switching equipment, Beijing
is putting increased pressure on foreign joint-venture partners to accelerate localization efforts.
Control of service markets
While China has been welcoming foreign suppliers for the telecommunications
infrastructure, it has very firmly stuck to its "3 No's"--policy of no any foreign participation in the
ownership, management, and operation of telecommunications services networks. Rooted in
concerns about national security and pride, the ban on foreign involvement in the service sector
became nevertheless weak as foreign operators began to test the limits of direct participation.
These changes came at a time when the MPT's authority as the single state-owned monopoly was
modified by the formation of Lian Tong and Ji Tong and by its own split into the DGT as
dominant carrier and the MPT as the regulator. As the sector was reformed, however, no
comprehensive regulatory regime has been able to clearly define the new role of the MPT. As a
result, much international attention has been focused on attempts by various companies to
participate in the service market, especially Hong Kong investors trying to break into radio paging
and cellular radio projects. Many foreign analysts and investors believe that China cannot meet the
target of 100 million PSTN lines by the year 2000 without direct foreign investment; according to
this view, adoption of the global privatization model is China's only rational choice. Nevertheless,
the MPT has responded on several occasions with stern pronouncements that foreign ownership
and operation of telecommunications services is not permitted. According to an announcement by
the MPT in 1993, "In China, it is not permitted for foreigners, including Hong Kong, Macro, and
Taiwan entities, to participate in the joint management of postal or telecommunications
operations, and the policy prohibiting foreign capital from being directly invested in these
operations has not changed. All those who have violated the above principles should immediately
rectify their mistakes and stop the execution of any contracts that already been signed or are now
being implemented."(National Trade Data Banks, 1993).
2.2 Electronics/Semiconductors
Development and Problems
China's electronics industry has shown remarkable improvement since the 1980's.
Quantitatively, China has achieved some successes in production of semiconductors and other
electronic products, as shown in Exhibit 2-1 and Exhibit 2-2. The total sector output value in
1990 was increased greatly by the early 1990's. Despite the gains, the gap between China and the
rest of the world in electronics continues to widen. This is primarily due to inefficient and
duplicate production, aging equipment, low labor productivity, and shortage of foreign exchange,
parts, and components. Quantitatively, the problem of component shortages is still serious.
Qualitatively, deep-seeded problems plague this sector, with the result that China's semiconductor
industry is at least 5-10 years behind the world leaders.(Simon, 1992) The major problems are
China's obsolete manufacturing facilities and inability to utilize at the factory level technological
advances made in the lab. These factors have fostered continued dependence on foreign-made
components in most areas. China's rapidly growing microcomputer industry, for example, still
requires imports to meet over 60 percent of its demand for semiconductors and integrated
circuits.(Simon, 1992)
Exhibit 2-2 Sectoral Composition of China's Electronics Industry, 1989
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Institutional Framework
Studying the organization of the electronics industry highlights the problems posed by
China's complex bureaucracy.
Exhibit 2-3 China's Semiconductor Output 1986-1990
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China's electronics industry is characterized by the presence of multiple ministerial-level
organizations involved in the research, production, and application of electronics technology,
components, and equipment. Many of the key ministerial organizations are represented on the
central government's Leading Group for the Invigoration of the Electronics Industry. But a
number of other ministries are also involved in electronics-related activities. Intense rivalry and
competition often emerge as each ministry attempts to build its own self-sufficient infrastructure
to support all its electronics needs. This rivalry occasionally spills over into the foreign trade and
investment area, forcing foreign companies to choose which ministry they conduct business with.
The MEI dominates national picture in the electronics area. The MEI has 170 enterprises
under its direct control, and also has a hand in administering mist of China's 2,400 electronics
factories and research institutes, many of which report to local or provincial authorities. (Simon,
1992)
Chinese officials in the electronic sector recognize that administrative interference in
enterprise affairs has constrained overall efficiency and productivity, and the MEI is one of the
first ministries to publicly relinquished some control over its factories. Although efforts to
decentralize the sector have been put and electronics enterprises have greater overall discretion on
matters of general management, decision-making authority is likely to be limited by the central
government's recent tightening of controls over China's foreign trade.
Industrial Policies: Learning and Catching-up
Since the early 1980s, China's top leaders--regardless of political inclination--have sought
to promote the development of the country's electronics industry. In their desire to take part in
the technological revolution, Chinese leaders have steadily increased funding for the
modernization of both research and development and manufacturing capabilities for
semiconductors and integrated circuits, the basic building blocks of the global electronics industry.
They realize that if China is to achieve a strong competitive position in the world economy, it will
have to establish a strong foundation in a range of informatics-linked technologies.
Chinese policy emphasizes foreign investment and technology import as the primary
mechanisms for both upgrading manufacturing capabilities and increasing local content. While
export promotion is encouraged as a means of earning hard currency to pay for such purchases,
Chinese leaders stress that they do not want to import components simply to export them again in
low value-added processed goods; the thrust of the strategy is to improve domestic capacity
through import substitution.
Chinese officials are counting on a plumber of foreign investment projects to propel the
components subsector during the 1990's. The priority being given to the electronics sector by the
central government, coupled with the industry's current inability to meet demand and innovate
technological advances, ensure numerous trade and investment opportunities for foreign firms in
the coming years. To date, the most ambitious of these involves Motorola, which has agreed to
set up an integrated circuit-manufacturing facility in Tianjin. The Motorola project, a wholly
foreign-owned enterprise, involves the establishment of an assembly and manufacturing facility foe
multi-purpose ICs. The company intends to gradually evolve its operations from assembly of semi
and complete-knockdown kits to technology transfer and full manufacturing operations.
However, few other US companies--or other foreign firms, for that matter--appear to have
thoroughly investigated manufacturing opportunities for higher-end products. In the
semiconductor and IC areas in particular, US companies have been too preoccupied with the
markets in Japan and Europe to pay much attention to China. Although the Motorola and NEC
projects may herald a new stage of higher-end foreign investment in electronics industry, many
foreign companies are clearly wary of introducing advanced technology into China, a potential
future competitor.
Nevertheless, China's electronics sector' dependence on foreign components will
continue. This dependence will be felt most in the computer field, where China's lack of
sophisticated manufacturing capability will prevent it from attaining the advanced technological
levels it seeks.
2.3 Computers
Accorded priority status by Beijing, China's high-tech electronics industry, which includes
computers, has received increasing investment and preferential treatment from the government.
China's economic development plans bode well for computer sales figure. The government hopes
to employ computers to modernize China's outdated industrial infrastructure as well as boost the
development of the nascent commercial sector, including the consumer and financial markets.
Computers are now being used in nearly every sector of the Chinese economy.
Development History and National Strategy Evolution
China's drive to develop its computer industry began in the early 1980's as part of the
nation's overall modernization efforts. Until 1979, China relied on imports from the Eastern bloc
as well as on domestically produced data processors, which used very low-end and outdated
vacuumtube technology.
During the early years of China's reform period (1981-85), China's objective was to build
a complete domestic computer industry from scratch and avoid dependency on the West. China
thus sought to attract foreign investment and technology, with which it would develop its own
mass-production facilities. This single-minded drive to acquire technology effectively distanced
foreign investors, who were unwilling to hand over their expertise without the guarantee of
substantive returns.
Direct sales were another matter, however, and foreign vendors were eager to make
inroads in the new China market. From 1981-85, China imported about $3.78 million worth of
computer equipment, mainly high-end systems, such as mainframes. (Hui and MaKown, 1993) By
1986, China's attitude toward technology transfer began to change. Government leaders realized
that their goals for technology acquisition were unrealistic, and began to negotiate more equitable
deals with foreign vendors. Early in this second phase of development (1986-90), the first Sino-
foreign computer joint ventures were formed, and, with this influx of foreign technology, the
domestic industry began to take shape. Efforts were concentrated on building facilities to
manufacture PC and small-scale computer hardware.
Since early 1990's, China has abandoned its course of self-reliance in computer production
and entered a third phase of development. Instead of trying to manufacture all types of computer
equipment on its own, China decided to import high-end equipment, including mainframes and
minicomputers, while manufacturing low-end products. At this time, China began to focus on the
previously neglected areas of software development and information technology services. The
concept of software as a viable industry is still a foreign notion to many users in China, who have
long relied on private software. Beijing, however, now recognizes that one of China's strengths
lies in its large pool of skilled software developers. The government is promoting these talents in
the hope that China will eventually become a major center for software development.
An Important Implication: All Eyes on Chips
The most imposing obstacle facing China's domestic computer manufacturing capability
was its dependence on imported chips. Until recently, China's IC production capability was low
and limited to ICs used in consumer goods, such as televisions and refrigerators. In the labs,
China could manufacture chips ranging from 1-3 microns, but still couldn't mass produce them.
ICs at the 1-3 micron level, were necessary for the production of basic computers such as Intel's
286- and 386- platform based PCs. (Hui and MaKown, 1993)
As a result, China had to import almost all ICs needed for computer production. Although
initially China was trying to build up its domestic IC production base, international restrictions
imposed by the COCOM prohibited China from gaining the technology needed to produce more
complex ICs. For China to reach current 1980's-1990's Western standards of semiconductor
technology, at least 20-30 years of research, development, and manufacturing efforts would be
needed. Realizing the odds against successful solo production, China has been actively searching
for foreign partners to develop IC production capability. Foreign computer manufacturers have an
important--and potential lucrative--role to play in modernizing China's computer industry.
PART II MOTOROLA: ROAD TO GLOBALIZATION
Chapter 3. History and Expansion of Motorola
With US$ 27 billion sales (1995) and 142,000 employees (1996) over six continents,
Motorola is one the world's leading providers of wireless communications, semiconductors, and
advanced electronic systems and services. Major equipment businesses include cellular telephone,
two-way radio, paging and data communications, personal communications, automotive, defense
and space electronics and computers. Communication devices, computers and millions of
consumer products are powered by Motorola's semiconductors.
3.1 History Background
Founded as the Galvin Manufacturing Corp. by Paul V. Galvin in 1928, the company
introduced the first commercially manufactured car radio under the brand name Motorola (Motor
+ Victrola = Motorola), and subsequently in 1947 adopted that name for the corporation. Over
the next 40 years the company was involved in several consumer lines as well as its
communications and semiconductor businesses, including car and home radios and televisions.
But in the early 1970's the company's focus shifted to high-technology industrial electronics,
including advanced mobile telecommunications (e.g., cellular phones) and advanced
semiconductors (e.g., microprocessors).
Over the years the company expanded into a wide array of communications and
electronics devices. The company grew rapidly, as shown in Exhibit 3-1.
Exhibit 3-1 Growth of Motorola (1930-1995)
Year Net Sales Earnings before
Income Taxes
1930 487k
1940 10m
1950 177m
1960 299m
1970 797m
1980 3.10b
1990 10.9b
1991 11.5b 6
1992 13.3b 8
1993 17.0b
1994 22.0b
1995 27.Ob 2
Sources: Adopted from Motorola Inc.
Return on Average
Invested Capital
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
00m
00m
1.5b
2.4b
.75b
Employees
NA 10
NA 985
NA 9,325
NA 14,740
NA 36,000
NA 71,500
NA 105,000
7.7% 102,000
9.5% 107,000
15.2% 120,000
7.5 % 132,000
14.5% 142,000
Motorola's operations can be described as highly decentralized, with business operations
structures into sectors, groups or divisions, depending on size. The company is organized in six
business groups, which primary products are listed below:
* The General Systems Sector designs, manufactures and distributes RF-based cellular
radiotelephones and systems, personal communications systems, computers and
microcomputer boards.
" The Semiconductor Products Sector designs, produces and distributes a broad line of discrete
semiconductors and integrated circuits, including microprocessors, RF devices,
microcontrollers, digital signal processors, memories and sensors.
* The Messaging, Information and Media Sector designs, manufactures and distributes a variety
of messaging products, including pagers and paging systems, wireless and wireline data
communications products, handwriting recognition software, infrastructure equipment,
systems and services.
* The Land Mobile Products Sector designs, manufactures and distributes analog and digital
two-way radio products and systems for applications worldwide, from on-site to wide area
communications.
e The Automotive, Energy and Controls Group designs and manufactures a broad range of
electronic components, modules and integrated electronic systems and products for
automotive, industrial, transportation, navigation, communication, energy systems, consumer
and lighting markets.
e The Government and Space Technology Group specializes in research, development and
production of electronic systems and products for US government projects and commercial
business. The group's Satellite Communications Division is developing the IRIDIUM satellite-
based communication system.
In the 1990's, Motorola is the largest provider of wireless communications equipment in
the world, and its semiconductor business leads the world in many of the markets it serves.
Building on technology platforms such as these, it creates new markets for its products, as well as
new industry segments. In terms of total sales, Motorola ranked No. 23 on the Fortune 5000.
(Henkoff, 1994)
In 1995, Motorola is No.1 in the world's cellular telephone, paging and two-way radio
industry and market. These wireless businesses account for about 60% of its total sales. And it the
world leader in many key segments of the semiconductor industry, with its semiconductor
business accounting for 29% of the company's total sales. The remainder of Motorola's sales
come from advanced electronics systems and components. Motorola's compound annual sales
growth rate of 24% over the last five years reflects the explosive growth of communication and
electronics in the global marketplace, especially in emerging economies. The most rapid rate of
growth was outside the United States. (Motorola Annual Report, 1995)
3.2 Corporate Culture
Motorola has a strong and homogeneous corporate culture despite the relative
independence of the various sectors, groups, and divisions of the organization. Al employees act
according to certain corporate values best captured in the Motorola global mission statement:
In each arena, we will grow rapidly by providing our customers what they want,
when they want it; with Six Sigma quality and best-in-class cycle time, as we
strive to achieve our fundamental objective of Total Customer Satisfaction and
goals of increased global market share; best-in-class people, products,
marketing, manufacturing, technology and service' and superior financial results.
The company's philosophy is to manage for long-term growth and profitability, while
consistently and appropriately investing in technology to maintain competitive leadership.
Motorola consistently emphasized Total Customer Satisfaction (TCS). In recognition of its
quality initiative, Motorola won the US national Mclcolm Baldrige Award in 1988. Motorola
spent nearly 10% of sales on R&D each year--over 1 billion--to maintain its engineering
leadership. Yearly plant and equipment investment--especially design and production
technologies--sales exceeded US$ 1 billion, and investments were made in training aimed at
developing employees' abilities to work with new technologies and processes. (Henkoff, 1994)
People at Motorola are empowered as long as they could show adequate performance and
aim at total customer satisfaction. For many years, Motorola stressed empowered team culture
that resulted in complex organizational structures that lead to team decision making. The
company recognized the value of its employees. Motorola set priorities in developing the
capabilities of its people. For this reason, emphasis was placed on training. All employees were
required to attend 40 hours of training per year, and this requirement was expected to increase in
coming years. Once an employee had worked for ten years in the company, there was an
unwritten rule stating that he/she cannot be laid off without the permission of the CEO.
3.3 Globalization and Emerging Markets
Motorola evolved from being a national company in its early years and a multinational in
the seventies, to a global institution in the eighties and nineties. With corporate headquarters in
Schuaumberg, Illinois, Motorola facilities are now located in 19 countries in North and Central
America, Europe and Asia, and above 40% of Motorola employees were non-US From 1993,
more than half of its revenue have been generated outside of the US, and international sales were
expected to increase to as much as 75% of total sales by 2000, as shown in Exhibit 3-2, Exhibit 3-
3 and Exhibit 3-4.
Exhibit 3-2. The Changing Composition of Global Employment at Motorola
Year US Workforce (%)
1983 65
1984 65
1985 65
1986 60
1987 59
1988 58
1989 57
1990 58
1991 57
1992 56
1993 56
Non-US Workforce (%)
35
35
35
40
41
42
43
42
43
44
44
Source: Motorola Workforce Statistics
Exhibit 3-3 Motorola non-US Sales Share of the Corporate Total
Actual Estimated
Year 1985 1992 1993 1995 2000 2020
% sales from Non-US 25 48 57 63 75 95
Source: Gohan, L. Janis. 1994. "Motorola-Penang". Harvard Business School Case 9-494-135. August 11, 1994.
Source: Gohan, L. Janis. 1994. "Motorola-Penang". Harvard Business School Case 9-494-135. August 11, 1994.
Exhibit 3-4 Market Sales by Region (in percentages), Motorola Inc., 1995
Rest of World
8%
Japan
8% 
United States
37%
China/HK
12%
Asia-Pacific
12%
Europe
23%
Chapter 4 Cornerstones and Core Competencies of Motorola
4.1 Institutionalizing Corporate Initiatives
The way Motorola does business is grounded in unchanging key beliefs with a dynamic
balance of customer-focused initiatives and strategies. They combine to create a unique set of
competitive strengths. Its management philosophy begins with two key beliefs--respect for the
dignity of the individual and uncompromising integrity in everything they do. This helps to create
an environment of empowerment for all in a culture of participation. It encourages Motorolaians
to manage for long-term growth and invest in technology to maintain competitive leadership.
Total Customer Satisfaction (TCS)--"Six Sigma" and "1oX Cycle Time"
Motorola's "Six Sigma"6 quality initiative has been one of the driving forces in achieving
competitive leadership. In the 1980's, Motorola promoted "Six Sigma" quality improvement as
one of two key corporate initiatives, in support of a goal of TCS. The second initiative, "lox
Cycle Time"7 was an attempt to attain dramatic improvements in new product development time,
manufacturing throughput, customer service and support functions' speed of execution.
Ambitious "reach-out" goals were set. Quality was to improve to reach the six sigma level by
1992. Cycle times--across all activities of the corporation--were to improve lOX by 1992. Six
Sigma and lOX Cycle Time were sometimes referred to as "renewal" initiatives, in that they
represented a renewed commitment to design, manufacturing, and service excellence. An
Motorola Training Education Center (MTEC) quality course, utilizing the Six Steps to Six
Sigma, was required of every Motorola employee. By 1993, 4,000 TCS teams were working on
improving product designs, manufacturing quality problems, and reducing work-in-process
inventory and cycle-time. Total manufacturing savings from TCS projects were estimated at over
US$ 2 billion since 1989. The corporate quality manager estimated that similar savings could be
6 "Six Sigma" indicates a quality level of 3.4 defects per million. Three-sigma design yields 2,700 defective parts
per million. A product design with 10,000 characteristics, either parts or manufacturing steps, yields 27 defects per
finished product. Since such products are becoming more common, traditional three-sigma designs are completely
inadequate.
7 "loX Cycle Time" refers to the cycle time goal: to reduce the time to perform every activity--manufacturing and
non-manufacturing--tenfold within five years.
achieved by administrative teams which, so far, were under-represented in the competitions.
(Gogan, 1994)
Participative Management Program (PMP)
The PMP, an initiative begun in the seventies, was supposed to enhance productivity by
increasing employee involvement, but by the early eighties some managers questioned its value.
PMP had several goals: increase employee's commitment to the success of the organization;
improve their quality of work life (and sense of satisfaction and loyalty); and encourage
employees to generate ideas for improving organizational effectiveness.
In the 1990's, Motorola is trying to allay the fear of loosing competitive advantages to
foreign workers by improving the productivity and motivation of workers in its US plants as well
as in its overseas operations. Interestingly, Motorola is adapting motivational techniques such as
team work that are successful with Malaysian workers to its US plants and is using lessons
learned in its Penang plant in Malaysia to boost the morale and involvement of workers back
home. This is a grand global experiment in plant management. The methods used to promote
worker excellence at the Penang plant are a big part of Motorola's blueprint for developing a
well-trained, motivated, and highly productive workforce, especially in emerging markets such as
China and Vietnam.
Training and Education: Motorola University
As early as in 1980, Bob Galvin advocated making a significant commitment to training
and education. He believed that new technologies created a more pressing need to increase
employees' skills, especially for production workers, who would be expected to monitor their
own quality and identify ways to improve processes. Motorola decided to allocate US$ 35 million
to establish the Motorola Training and Education Center (MTEC). By 1989, 54,000 participants
had taken the Six Sigma course. MTEC added to its original charter remedial skills training,
supplier, customer and distributor training, and collaboration with public school systems and
universities. It was re-named "Motorola University", in recognition of the broader scope of
activities. By 1994 Motorola was spending about US$ 120 million on education annually.
4.2 Key Competencies
A measure of Motorola's competitive strengths is portfolio of intellectual property rights.
The number of US patents issued to Motorola in the last five years has risen from 613 in 1991 to
1,016 in 1995. Motorola ranked No.3 in the United States. (Motorola News Release, 1995) As
the software content of its products increases and the cost of computing drops, sophisticated
products become easier to use and less expensive. This creates enormous new global market
opportunities and spurs Motorola's investments in the skills of its people, in software
development, and in its ability to manufacture efficiently, anywhere in the world. Motorola has
embarked on the largest world-wide expansion in semiconductor capacity in its history. Motorola
has also reshaped customer-supplier relationships as systems-level integration and combinational
technologies revolutionize the industry.
Industries such as cellular and paging are built on Motorola's core technical competencies,
including software, semiconductor and radio frequency design.
Technology has transformed Motorola's original two-way land mobile radio business. This
market has grown from 33 million subscribers in 1992 to about 45 million at the end of 1995.
(Motorola News Release, 1995) Astro digital technology has renewed markets such as public
safety, while radius two-way radios have penetrated consumer dispatch and telephone
interconnect, voice and data. IDEN systems are targeted for workgroups on the move.
Communications is also one of the fastest-growing segments of the semiconductor market.
That's one reason that Motorola's Semiconductor Products Sector has achieved a compound
annual growth of 23% since 1991. Motorola has a breadth and scope of products that is
unmatched in the industry. In addition to wireless, Motorola is No.1 in several of the fastest-
growing markets, including energy/environment and industrial; automotive; multimedia set-top
boxes; personal computer printers; and interactive, microcontoroller-based smartcards. (Motorola
News Release, 1995)
As technologies and markets converge, the PowerPC microprocessor is becoming more
attractive. The PowerPC scales the full range of applications, from computing to embedded
control. More than 40 companies have selected the PowerPC as their desktop, laptop,
workstation or server processor, while hundreds will use the PowerPC for embedded applications.
The PowerPC platform is at the heart of a full range of offerings from the Motorola Computer
Group. (Motorola News Release, 1995)
Part III Motorola-China: Win-win Success
Chapter 5 Motorola in China
Motorola has been one of the most successful US companies in China, operating a wholly
owned group of factories and joint ventures that assemble mobile phones, pagers and
semiconductors for sale in China. Its sales on the mainland have been growing at more than 50% a
year and over US$ 2 billion since 1994, making China Motorola's largest market outside the US.
The cash generated by those sales, however, has so far been plowed back into expanding its
business in China. (The Wall Street Journal, 1995)
5.1 Journey to the East
Encouraged by China's prospering economy and immense market, Motorola's journey to
China started in the mid 1980's when Bob Galvin, former chairman of Motorola and the
company's visionary leader for 50 years, turned his attention to China. After the careful country
study followed his first visit to China in 1986, he decided Motorola should invest in China. A new
chapter in the annals of the company's history opened up.
After that, Motorola set up three representative offices in China's Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou. Until China-based manufacturing facilities were in operation in early 1990's,
Motorola exported mostly finished goods to China, including Motorola's popular two-way radios,
pagers, cellular and cordless telephones. Customers were mostly large Chinese entities like public
security, transportation, and utility companies, as well as some foreign concerns operating in
China.
In the 1990's, Motorola's businesses in China covers a wide variety of its major business
lines, i.e. semiconductors, communications and general systems. Believing that to succeed in
China, it needs to manufacture there, Motorola negotiated with Chinese government and set up a
wholly owned venture in Tianjin in 1988. By year end of 1993, it completed a US$ 120 million
first-phase plant in the Tianjin Economic & Technology Development Area to make pagers,
simple integrated circuits, and cellular phones. A 2nd-phase plant also came on line in the
following years.
In recent years, Motorola has been laying the groundwork for what will be Corporate
America's biggest manufacturing venture in China. To date, Motorola has committed to invest
US$ 1.2 billion in the country and branched out into half a dozen joint ventures, five years ahead
of its investment target. That makes Motorola the No.1 US investor in China (See Appendix 1)
By the mid of 1996, Motorola's over 6,000 Chinese employees work mostly in a cluster of
factories around the port city of Tianjin, where they make pagers and cell phones and pack
semiconductors into housings, some for domestic use, others for export.(Schoenberger, 1996)
A brief review of Motorola's China investments, as shown in Exhibit 5-1, indicates the
company's commitment to the fast and important emerging market for Motorola's expansion in
the region. 1995 was a milestone year for Motorola China, because it significantly increased the
level of its investments with the addition of a US$ 720 million sub-micron, 8-inch, wafer fab in
Tianjin, that is a mark of its commitment and confidence in China as a manufacturing base and
major market for Motorola. (Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd., 1996)
Exhibit 5-1 Motorola's Investments in China 1992-1995
12 1 491925
CO)
Year
Source: Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd., 1996
To reinforce the confidence that Motorola has already expressed in China, Motorola
directed its operations in North Asia from a new regional headquarters for the Greater China built
in Beijing. In November, 1995, Motorola bought a 19-store and 32,000-sq m building to house
the management, marketing and engineering departments, a software center, the Asia
Manufacturing Research Center, Motorola University, and a multi-function customer service
center. (Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd., 1996)
5.2 Strategic Moves and Achievements in China
Motorola set up the following basic strategic goals for its 1990's China businesses.
1. Investment/Technology Transfer: By the year 2000, total investment is scheduled to reach 1.2
billion US dollars, aimed at to introduce the advanced technology and equipment, to assist
further the Chinese electronics industry, and to support the country's fast economic
development.
2. Management Localization: Most of Motorola's operations in China will be localized during
the second half of the decade.
3. Local Souring: To increase the proportion of local components in Motorola products.
4. Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances: To develop more joint ventures from the basis of a
wholly-owned enterprise.
Transferring Advanced Technologies
With consistent efforts for years, Motorola (China) has successfully worked with China's
central government telecommunications authority, the MPT, to adopt Motorola's advanced
paging network protocol, FLEX, as China's national standards. Motorola has signed a contract
with a dozens of provincial governments and municipalities to expand their province/city-wide
paging network using FLEX protocol.
In 1995, Motorola announced a major joint venture with Panda Electronics Group
Company (Nanjing, China), one of China's leading electronics companies, and Motorola
International Development Corporation (MIDC), Motorola's wholly-owned subsidiary in
Schaumburg, Illinois. Under terms of the multifaceted agreement between the two companies, a
new entity, Nanjing Power Computer Ltd., will be created to develop, produce and sell computer
systems based on PowerPC microprocessors. Motorola holds a 60 percent equity investment and
Panda Electronics Group Company holds a 40 percent equity in the new company. Initially,
Motorola's computer group will supply Nanjing Power Computer with its Atlas motherboard
based on the PowerPC 603e(tm) and 604(tm) microprocessors for integration into new RISC PC
computer systems that target the Chinese marketplace. Ultimately, Nanjing Power Computer will
have the potential to develop new RISC PCs for China and other markets in Asia. The first
products that emerge from Nanjing Power Computer will run Microsoft's popular Windows NT
3.51 operating system.
Also, in 1995, Motorola made two further major investments in China. The first of these
investments was the announcement in September that Motorola would establish a large capacity
integrated circuit wafer fab in the Xiqing Development Zone in Tianjin. The plant, with a total
floor space of more than 300,000 sq m, would produce state-of-the-art technology, sub-micron,
8-inch wafers. Motorola again increased in commitment to China with a US$ 99 million
investment announced in December 1995, for the production of GSA and CDMA standard
products, the establishment of subsidiaries and service centers in 30 cities, the setting up of the
Asia Manufacturing Research Center (AMRC), and expansion of the software design center, all to
take place within 3 years. Motorola businesses have also implemented or are planning research
and development centers in Beijing for Cellular Infrastructure and Cellular Subscriber Group and
for Paging Products Group.
Localization and Training
Motorola realized that without a proactive policy of localization for employees, its goal to
take root in China could not be realized. Among its six thousand employees in Motorola's varied
operations in China, many have been recruited from top universities/colleges and high schools in
China. A plan has also been set and implemented to attract higher caliber of Chinese students
studying overseas. Motorola's localization strategy has met with success and continues to make
good progress, with batch after batch of quality Chinese employees joining the company and
being offered a succession of key positions within the company.
Motorola understood that the company's success in China is dependent upon significant
levels of local expertise among its employees, people who are not only familiar with Motorola's
products and technologies, but are also accustomed to Motorola's corporate management and
culture. Based on this understanding, Motorola unveiled a plan to step up the implementation of
its localization policy by means of rigorous training for all. Courses were offered to Chinese
employees at all levels both in-country and at other Motorola facilities around the world.
The unique Motorola University has been playing an important role as a catalyst for
Change through continuous learning. Motorola University has expanded its operations both in the
United States and abroad. The opening of the Galvin Center for Continuing Education in 1986
and the Singapore training Design Center in 1989 brought new educational opportunities to
employees around the world. Since 1990, Motorola University had diversified further, establishing
academic partnerships with institutes of higher learning around the world. Motorola University
has also implemented cultural design and translation services. This has become especially
important as Motorola moves into new and emerging markets in eastern Europe, South America
and the Asia-Pacific region, China included.
Major localization and training programs in China have been implemented in recent years.
These include localization and training for both management and employees. The management
staff localization policy centers mainly on its training programs. Through these, Motorola raised
the employees' engineering skills level while imbuing them with the company's culture which
stresses personal integrity, respect for others, mutual corporate and loyalty. Among Motorola's
numerous training programs, the China Accelerated Management Program (CAMP) stood out as
the company's flagship education initiative. CAMP has become Motorola's way of translating its
promise to China into reality and promise to train a certain number of Chinese people with the
potential to form the future management of Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd. Exhibit 5-2 and
Exhibit 5-3 show the plans for localization and training implemented in Motorola (China).
Exhibit 5-2 Management Locdlization
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Another element of localization strategy is the local sourcing. Motorola, in its bid to
accelerate China's modernization, is actively implementing its plan to increase the local content of
its products. In Motorola (China), "Local Souring" means that the company actively develops
local suppliers and provides overall support to them in technology, management and training. This
investment intends to help them to become not only its preferred suppliers of components, but
also raise their technical level and allow them to expand their growth in other directions rapidly.
"We are striving hard to develop twenty domestic suppliers into large-scale enterprises, or even
multinational enterprises", said P.Y.Lai, President of Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd. As shown
in Exhibit 5-4, the local purchases has been planed to increased to 55 percent by the year 1998
from the 20 percent in 1994.
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Emphasis on Quality
If the localization and training are impressive, then how about the quality? Motorola is
famous for its Total Customer Satisfaction (TCS) and "Six Sigma". Motorola has extended its
culture of strong emphasis on quality in its China business. Motorola realizes that creating a
quality environment for its people is at heart of its ability to deliver on the expectations of its
customers and to maintain its growth and success in the challenging years ahead in China market.
True believers at Motorola talk of quality as it is enshrined in the concepts of TCS and
"Six Sigma". Slogans did every well in China, and sure enough, they took--buttressed by the kind
of intensive training that Motorola's total control over its operations there made possible.
(Appendix 2) For instance, within six months after starting semiconductor assembly at one
temporary facility, rookie Chinese line operators had achieved Six Sigma output quality, an
achievement well above average.
By 1995, some of the quality awards won by Motorola's China operations included:
" The Executive Quality Award, conferred on the Tianjin Paging Factory;
" ISO 9002 Quality Certificate awarded to cellular Subscriber Group's factory in Tianjin;
" ISO 9002 awarded to Paging Products Group, licensing it to the use of the network of MPT
as well as earning them UL acknowledgment;
e ISO 9002 awarded to Tianjin Semiconductor Plant.
Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances
While maintaining and continuing to establishing independently funded and wholly-owned
ventures in China, Motorola has been also branching out into half a dozen joint ventures there.
Cooperation was a key to its strategy of imbuing Motorola with Chinese characteristics.
Motorola's major joint venture with the MPT's Hangzhou Communication Equipment Factory on
technology transfer has been a successful example. In recent two years, other major joint ventures
set up or contracted include the Nanjing Power Computer Ltd., the joint venture set up with
Nanjing Panda Electronics Company Ltd., to produce and sell PowerPC, and the Shanghai
Motorola Paging Products Co. Ltd., a joint venture with Shanghai Radio Communication
Equipment Manufacturing Company, to produce the latest technology FLEX pagers. In addition,
in 1995, Motorola signed a number of contracts with the Chinese electronics and
telecommunications industry and invested more in China's middle and western regions, which help
China narrow the regional gap in economic development. One of them was the Leshan Phoenix
Semiconductor Company Ltd., by Motorola and the Leshan Radio Company Ltd. in a central
province, Sichuan, with total investment to 55.3 million US dollars. (Motorola (China)
Electronics Ltd., 1996)
In a telling sign of East-West synergy, another joint venture was set up to supply
components for the cars that eventually roll off the line at a new factory being planned by an
alliance between General Motors and one of China's biggest carmakers, Shanghai Automotive
Industry.
To achieve its long-term strategic objectives of competitive advantages in China market,
Motorola understood well the importance for the improvement of staff quality and national
standards. It was stated that part of Motorola's goals is to accelerate China's economic
development through investment in higher-education and research. Motorola therefore has
consistency to upheld its intentions to cooperate with universities and colleges in China. To date,
Motorola has invested about US$ 300,000, for the establishment of scholarships in Tsinghua
University, Beijing University, and other key Chinese Universities and more than 2,000 students
received the scholarships from Motorola endowments; it has invested 2.5 million US dollar-worth
of equipment to establish a training center in Nanjing Posts and Telecommunications College; and
it has also invested another US$ 350,000 for the establishment of application and development
centers in Tsinghua University, Fudan University and Guangdong Polytechnic University.
(Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd., 1996)
Good Corporate Citizenship
Motorola has taken its role as a responsible corporate citizen in China very seriously, as
Motorola's CEO Gary Tooker said, "We seek a partnership with China for mutual development.
Closely linked with this strategy is our promise to be a worthy corporate citizen of China,
participating in and contributing to the building of a caring and responsible society."
As a member of society, Motorola paid particular attention to safeguarding its image and
setting itself up as a model for foreign-funded enterprises in China. The company obeyed laws and
regulations, paid taxes and strictly condemned unfair competition and corrupt business practices.
At the same time, realizing the importance of adopting to the Chinese culture and society,
Motorola wholeheartedly supported China's social welfare programs by implementing its
employee housing program and has been an enthusiastic contributor to China's fundamental
education and "Project Hope".
EHOP To help employees realize their dream of owning homes and in support of
China's "Comfortable Housing Project," Motorola unveiled its own Employee
Home Ownership Program (EHOP). In 1995, construction began in Beijing and
Tianjin on three residential developments, making the start of an ambitious project
for the company. It was planed that more than 3,000 Motorola employees will own
their own homes by the year 2000.
Project Hope Motorola also extended its learning culture to the communities in
which it serves. In China, the company has been helping build a base of elementary
schools in needy regions across the country, where children might otherwise be
deprived of education--In China nearly 200 million people are illiterate, nearly 25%
of the world's illiteracy rate and in the past 10 years about one million children
have dropped out of school as a result of poverty. In the face of this sad fact,
Motorola has risen to the challenge using "Project Hope", China's own national
initiative to help combat poverty, deprivation and illiteracy, and has aroused the
concerns of many circles of society including business, encouraging them to
become involved in this noble cause. By the end of 1995, Motorola had donated
3.8 million yuan to Project Hope and has built 16 Hope primary schools in China.
In 1996 Motorola will donate a further 3 million Yuan to be spent on improving
existing school facilities and training teachers. The company also plans to build a
Hope school that will serve as model for education in China. (Motorola (China)
Electronics Ltd., 1996)
Chapter 6 Beyond the Love Story: Dynamic High-tech Strategies
In certain industries, companies can become market leaders by developing distinctive
competence in technological innovation. At the same time, this places them in a strong bargaining
position with local governments. The acquisition of advanced technologies is seen by most
governments as critical to the future of their countries. To be successful, the company must
generate a continuous flow of innovative products as well as a continuous demand for these
products. Motorola is an example of global company that uses dynamic high-tech strategies in its
China business, especially in China's telecommunications and electronics sectors.
6.1 Competitive Environment and S.W.O.T. Analysis
China's economy was surging in recent years. Its telecom revolution and electronics
industry development flew naturally from those changes. Demand for physical and information
infrastructure as well as consumer goods has exploded, and telephones top the list. A thriving
market economy and pooled family savings have put a phone within reach of many residents in
almost all of China cities and some rich rural areas.
No other nation in the history of telecommunications has had more ambitious plans than
China's. Take the wireline telephone service as an example, by the year 2000, China wants to
raise its telephone density to 5-6 per 100 people from less than one percent in early 1990's.
China's wireless (cellular and paging) communications market was believed to take off, with a
possible 50% annual growth rate in the last decade of this century. (The Wall Street Journal,
1994)
The battle for China looms as one of the greatest industrial contests of the century. The
major competitors in China's telecommunications industry are all multinational and
multitechnology companies with their main activities in the computer, communications and
electronics businesses. Major players include America's AT&T, IBM, and Motorola, Sweden's
Ericsson, France's Alcatel, Germany's Siemens, Finland's Mobria (Nokia), Japan's NEC,
Panasonic (Matsushia), Hitachi, and Toshiba as well as Hong Kong's Champion. Motorola faced
fierce competition in all business fronts: products--cellular phones, pagers, and network
infrastructure, distribution/sales, technology and R&D, and government relations...
With surging demand for telephones in China, many foreign firms were seeking to enter
the market through operating and service agreements. Unfortunately, foreign companies were
prohibited by Chinese government form operating China's telecommunications services. Open to
foreigners were merely the equipment manufacturing and/or supply.
Foreign company found that the hardest part of doing business in China was coming to
terms with the laborious and at times unfathomable decision-making process of the Chinese
bureaucracy. Chinese customers, being they mainly government entities themselves, of these
foreign suppliers were very demanding, constantly in request of more technical information and
better commercial terms. Moreover, in dealing with foreign firms, Chinese government didn't not
want to be dependent on one supplier and assures itself the best deal possible by making foreign
firms compete with each other. This has been seen in many important projects that have been
going to European firms because of their willingness to transfer technology under more flexible
arrangements. European companies often view technology transfer to developing countries in a
different light than Japanese or American firms.
The battle in the front of mobile telephone business, illustrates the typical competitive
environments in which the major players were fighting. The following analysis examplizes this
competition between Motorola and Ericsson, who together dominated China's wireless
communications market for years. This illustrates comparative strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats (S.W.O.T), which help explain Motorola's performance.
Ericsson, another leading telecom giant in the mobile telephone business and switching
systems, has been competing with Motorola head to head in China market. Ericsson pursued an
aggressive strategy to penetrate China's telecommunications market. Despite selling its first
telephone to China about one hundred years ago, Ericsson did not set up a representative office in
the China until the early 1980's. Ten years later, the Swedish company operated four offices,
employed hundreds of staff, sold millions of US dollars of public switching equipment and cellular
mobile systems, and also had manufacturing ventures in China. Ericsson's intention was to be a
supplier that don't hold shares in companies that compete with its biggest customer, the MPT and
its provincial counterparts has bolstered the company's position with the MPT.
Ericsson's business was quite successful on China's new, but fast growing cellular market,
in which Ericsson and Motorola were the archrival. The company installed the first cellular
systems in Qinhuangdao, Hebei province of the central and the largest cellular systems in terms of
numbers of subscribers in Guangzhou in the south. Ericsson now has the most systems in place in
China, far surpassing its competitors, Motorola and NEC. Among many factors, an earlier entry
should attribute to the huge lead.
Worldwide, Motorola has had the largest market share in the mobile telephone industry
and has increased its share from 13% in 1987 to about 85% by the mid-1990s. Motorola's success
has been achieved in an industry which includes some of the toughest competitors present in the
industrialized world, i.e. the Japanese firms NEC, Toshiba, Matsushita and Hitachi, and the
Swedish firm Ericsson. (Oskarsson, 1994)
Competition for putting in wireless telephone systems in China was fierce. Compared to
Ericsson, Motorola may have been slow to get a foothold in fastest growing south of China, but it
has had considerable success in the North. It put in Shanghai's main system in 1988 and Beijing's
first system at about the same time. Moreover, it is stronger than the Swedish company in
subscriber equipment for Ericsson only in 1990 announced a portable product. Ericsson and
Pacific Link Communications of Hong Kong donated a system to Beijing, which was installed
before 1990's Asian Games on Beijing. Whether had this "freebie" given Ericsson a significant
advantage over Motorola in China's cellular battle? At any rate, the deal did not cause Motorola
to lose any business: At the same time Ericsson was donating Beijing Telecommunications
Authority (BTA) the system, BTA gave Motorola an order to expand Beijing's existing system.
What are Motorola's key strengths in wireless communications industry? Motorola is
proud of its proven ability to nature and drive the growth of emerging consumer and technology
market. Specific to the wireless industry, Motorola has (a) two-way, wireless communication
expertise; (b) infrastructure equipment and relationships; (c) a breadth of enabling technology
expertise (radio frequency, microprocessor technologies, miniaturization of technology, etc.); (d)
software that will provide an industry-standard development and deployment environment; (e) a
solutions-based strategy that combines a wide range of Motorola expertise integrated with other
leading vendor's technologies; and (f) high-quality, low-cost manufacturing expertise.
In particular, according to industry experts, weight and size are the two most critical
performance parameters for customer satisfaction. A study by Oskarsson in 19948 shows that
Motorola has consistently introduced new generations of mobile telephones with significantly
lower product weights, as much as two years before the major competitors, Ericsson included, as
can be seen in Appendix 3, 4 and 5, which show connection technological capacities to
competitive positions. Therefore, Motorola has been the leader in terms of product performance
for some time. Moreover, Motorola's profitability from mobile telephones has been the highest in
the industry, varying between 20% and 30%, despite the rapid growth in market shares and an
aggressive cutting of telephone prices in many markets to gain further market shares. With such
high margins, it is not surprising that Motorola is also judged by industry observers to be the
industry cost leader, with an estimated cost advantage compared with NEC of about 5% and,
compared with Ericsson and Nokia-Mobira, one of about 20%. Therefore, Motorola's
pronounced generic strategy is cost leadership combined with differentiation through high product
performance, i.e. a "stuck in the middle strategy". (Oskarsson and Sjoberg, 1994)
Industry experts believed that the key to the success of Motorola lies in massive
investments in technologies which are both cost and performance driving. This has been drown
from the relative technological positions indicated by a data that show comparative number of
patents of granted in Europe for Motorola, NEC, Ericsson and Mobira. That data illustrated that,
First, Motorola has invested heavily in all important sub-technologies, and is almost equal
regarding the scope and depth of the technology base of its cellular terminals; Secondly, Motorola
is superior to both Ericsson in both scope and depth of technological activities in cellular
technologies; Thirdly Ericsson mainly invested in performance-driving technologies (mainly
analogue radio technology and analogue signal processing).
In China, Motorola not only sold and installed cellular systems but also trained Chinese
technicians on installation, operation, and maintenance. Training has been all part of the package
that Motorola offered to its Chinese customers. The package involved formal classes in the US,
on-site courses, and on-the-job training. Motorola also offered repair services and established
repair facilities in China. When Motorola sold a cellular system to Chinese customers, being
8 Detailed data and analysis are provided by Oskarsson and Sjoberg, 1994.
they usually government offices or public entities, it typically sold phone units with it --one of the
China market's unusual features. The Chinese like package deals: Not only do they get an overall
price discount, but they do not have to ask more than once for funding and approval.
In addition, Motorola also seeks to establish strategic alliances even with its competitors.
Motorola designs and manufactures cellular telephones that can be used with its own systems or
on any other standard cellular systems. In 1995, Motorola and Ericsson agreed to link their
cellular telephone systems, creating what they said would be one of the world's widest cellular
networks. The agreement would allow subscribers to use their telephones in all of China's 26
provinces.
6.2 Matching Dynamics: Happy Marriage?
Just as every chess piece is essential to the outcome of the overall game, Motorola's own
development is irrevocably tied to that of China. It is Motorola's firm belief that only when
China's economic reforms have borne fruit can be company too claim to have been successful in
China.
China asserts an increasingly prevalent policy: companies must pay for access to this fast-
growing market or be left out in the cold. Bolstered by the knowledge that many of the world's
multinationals crave a share of China's growth, Beijing demands-and often gets-the same up-to-
date technology driving the industrialized world. Motorola provides such an example with its
plans to build advanced wireless messaging system and high-tech computer-chip plant in China
and China plans to capitalize on its technology.
First came the story of Motorola's paging protocol deal with China. Economic
Management Consultants Incorporated projects that by 1999 there will be more than 140 million
paging subscribers in the Asia Pacific region, making this region the fastest growing and largest
paging market in the world. According to their 1994 report, approximately 75 percent to 85
percent of pager sales in Asia Pacific will come form China, South Korea and Japan. ( The Wall
Street Journal, 1996)
China has become Motorola's key foreign market over the past six years, largely from its
pager business, and Motorola has successfully had China adopt FLEX paging protocol, an
advanced paging technology from Motorola, which has been believed the key to the future of
wireless messaging, as its first national paging standard. This really solidified Motorola's position
as the leading technology supplier for years to come.
The MPT is the ministry in charge of telecommunications policy making and standards and
is also the biggest telecommunications service provider in China. As the government body
responsible for ensuring efficient telecommunications and paging services in China, it is essential
the MPT has a proven technology in place that offers features such as higher capacity, roaming,
flexibility to grow and new value-added services nationwide. The MPT evaluated various paging
protocols from the world's leading paging manufacturers for over a year. Its decision to adopt the
FLEX protocol was based on the need to provide next-generation technology for China's rapidly
expanding pager subscriber base.
That, however, was not the end of the story. While Motorola was eager to keep its
market dominance, it also faced new competition and criticism by China that Motorola wasn't
sharing enough technology with the Chinese. Along with China's memorandum of understanding
to adopt the new technology, FLEX paging protocol, Motorola was planning a joint venture with
the MPT to construct FLEX-protocol pagers, in the hope that the venture could partly end the
technology-transfer criticism by the Chinese.
And even that was not enough. After allowing Motorola to become the biggest seller of
pagers and cellular phones in China, Beijing evidently believed that it was owed much more.
In 1995, Motorola announced its plan to spend US$ 720 million to build a computer-chip
plant in Tianjin, China, considerably increasing its commitment in what has become its fastest-
growing market and giving a huge boost to Beijing's dreams of developing high-tech industry.
The new Tianjin facility would produce eight-inch silicon wafers etched with electronic circuitry.
The wafers are then cut and assembled into operation in the first quarter of 1998 with an initial
production of 3,000 wafers a week.(Smith, 1995)
Why was Motorola building a computer-chip plant in windswept northeastern China? The
high-tech factory would be automated, so China's cheap labor wasn't the reason. Nor was
China's market for that kind of advanced chips, which remained small. The real explanation might
be more political than practical. "Motorola has earned quite a lot of money in the mobile
telephone market in China," as said Wu Jichuan, the minister of China's MPT, "It's high time for
them to transfer some technology."
By the mid-1990's, Motorola had already assembled computer chips, cellular phones and
pagers at its sprawling factory complex in Tianjin. Much of that production was sold to China,
along with Motorola products imported from overseas. But unlike most other manufacturers
selling to the domestic market from factories in China. Motorola was the sole owner of its
operations--rather than sharing ownership with a Chinese partner.
That privilege dates to Motorola's bold move to invest in China shortly after the 1989
student demonstrations in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. When Motorola just started negotiating a
deal for local operations moths earlier, its desire for 100% ownership proved a major sticking
point. Some Chinese officials insisted that Motorola accept a joint venture, part-owned by
Chinese--the usual arrangement for foreign investors. Then, reacting in horror to June 4th event,
many foreign investors canceled deals, and some pulled out of China altogether. Motorola,
however, stayed the course and eventually got what it wanted from the government who was then
eager to cajole big investors and restore international confidence. In explaining Motorola's
decision, Mr. Tam, the semiconductor division boss of Motorola who was a key player on the
negotiating team, once said: "We felt the best way to help the Chinese people was to continue
dialogue and engage," and "Motorola believed it was a regrettable event but not the end of the
world. China basically looked to us as a friend, and the time you need a friend most is when
you're in hot water." The company quickly captured a major share of the country's exploding
telecommunications market: Motorola's cellular-phone and pager sales to China in 1994 topped
US$ 1.5 billion, making it the company's largest market outside the US. (The Wall street Journal,
1995)
Ever since, however, Beijing has complained that Motorola should share its success with
China. The government has been slow in granting approvals for the company to expand
production at its Tianjin factories. And for months, China's leaders have pushed the company to
build the computer-chip plant.
China already had several wafer-fabrication plants but was eager for more. Furthermore,
China wanted to upgrade its high-tech industries from mere assembly operations so that it needn't
rely on imports to supply its growing technology needs. The domestic Chinese chip industry was
chugging along--but hardly flying. Between 1992 and 1995, it tripled the annual value of its
production of integrated circuits to US$ 500 million, and it is likely to hit the US$ 1.2 billion
mark by the year 2000.' But China's wafer production was still crude by global standards, in that
a key to success in the industry is imprinting ever smaller integrated circuits, or chips, in ever
greater numbers on ever larger wafers of pure silicon. The Chinese then could only etch lines
about one micron in width (a micron is a fraction of the width of a human hair) and typically
imprint them on wafers four to five inches in diameter. Elsewhere in the world, industry leaders
like Motorola could make chips as small as 0.5 to 0.35 micron on eight-inch wafers. When its
Tianjin plant is finished by late 1990's, Motorola will set a new standard for Chinese chipmaking
by fabricating 0.8 micron chips on eight-inch wafers. (The Wall street Journal, 1995)
More important for Chinese, the factory, though to be wholly-owned by Motorola, will
build semiconductors from scratch and tech a legion of young Chinese everything there to know
about the delicate process. Still, while no trade secrets will be officially passed along to the local
competition, it will be difficult to keep the Chinese engineers employed on the site by Motorola
from picking up on-the-job expertise that might be useful to rivals.
What should also be noticed is the another dimension of the politics with the deal. Until
recently, much of the technology flowing into China was considered too advanced to give to a
Communist state or a potential military rival by the West's COCOM. But the end of the Cold War
sharply reduced those barriers. Now, China can demand access to almost any previously restricted
technologies, and multinationals have little bargaining power to resist.
Chief among the technologies Beijing wants is semiconductor production. It is a tough
sell. While numerous manufacturers have moved into China with chip-assembly operations, which
rely heavily on cheap labor, actual chip production remains an expansive, highly automated
process. As a result, few foreign companies have put chip-fabrication plants in China.
In 1994, Japan's NEC Corp. became one of the first to open a semiconductor fabrication
plant in China, with a Beijing venture designed to produce chips for consumer-electronics
products. But the factory wasn't entirely NEC's idea. While its investment would help fill local
demand, a company spokesman concedes that "it was required by China to make fabrication and
9 According to Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International, a U.S. trade association.
assembly of semiconductors in China" as a condition of its continued presence in the fast-growing
Chinese market for telecommunication switches.
Not everyone, of course, was willing to play the game. Some were worrying that the West
was giving too much. During negotiations in 1995 for a US$ 1 billion minivan deal, America's
Chrysler Corp. balked at China's demand for patent rights to technology used in making the vans.
That's fine--the converted award went to Germany's Mercedes-Benz ERG, instead.
Ironically, though Western technology might transform China from a customer to
competitor in several key industries, few multinationals were willing to reject Beijing's demands.
"China is going to be a competitor in the future," argued Robert Hitt, head of McDonnell Douglas
corp.'s China operations. "If we're their partners, we'll eliminate them as competitors." Some
others seem not worried, believing that there won't be much local domestic competition for a
while and the Chinese "are very far behind," as said Lai, a former Intel executive, "If we were to
let them catch up, it would be because we were slipping".
Is this gamble paying off? So far so good. Motorola's sales in China and Hong Kong have
shattered expectations. Nearly doubling over two years to reach US$ 3.2 billion in 1995--almost
12% of the corporation's worldwide revenue. (Motorola Inc., 1995) Cellular phones account for
a substantial chunk, and the potential market for these handy gadgets is enormous--three million
new cellular phones a year until the end of the decade, according to a Chinese government
estimate.
But what about profits? The details remain secret now. But Motorola (China)'s President
Lai denied a Wall Street Journal report early in 1995 maintaining that the company loses money
on every cell phone it made and sold on China. Price competition was brutal, Lai conceded, but he
insisted, "we are making good profits in China." Whatever local operating profit might be, Lai
said it all got plowed back into the local market.
Chapter 7 Implications: Success Formula for Foreign-China Ventures?
7.1 What Can We Say about China Markets?
To win emerging high-tech markets in China, foreign companies should acquaint
themselves with the most dynamic characteristics of Chinese industry and government. While
many may be worth discussion, the following sector provides some important implications drawn
from the evolution of China's industrial policy and Motorola's China experience. These include:
(a) the definitive influence of the State, (b) the appropriateness of technology transfer, (c) the
importance of personal relations or 'guanxi", and (d) the emerging of localism.
The Definitive Influence of the State
A Chinese lawyer in Beijing once confided that the biggest problem he had with his often
bedazzled Western clients was educating them to the reality that the "economy is under State
control, and thus the State can intervene in any deal, at any time, under any pretext". The key
importance of the state in business in China is why foreign firms must have a strategic
understanding of the political dynamics of the country. It is also helpful to keep in mind that
despite the promulgation of many laws, in China, firms are faced with a system of rules are
contained in "neibu" (internal) documents, which are secret--and thus may be applied at the whim
of the decision maker. The state of China's international relations also impacts business
relationships.
An understanding of China's official priorities and bureaucratic dynamics--be they
expressed in national plans, policy statements, or even dinner conversations--is important. China
wants ethnology--hard and soft--plus foreign market access in certain strategic high-tech
industries. If you can structure the deal to respond to these Chinese priorities, you are going to
have an easier time in the bureaucratic maze of approvals, services, and inspections. And if you
can find a niche that responds to those priorities--such as Motorola's and Ericsson's Telecom
ventures--you have a fair shot at success. Non-priority items--such as speculative real estate
deals--may be allowed, especially if when things get tight. However, watch for corruption and
squeeze: more than one Hong Kong businessman employs several "government relations"
employees in factories in Guangdong province.
The Appropriateness of Technology Transfer
A central dilemma foreign firms encounter when transferring technology to China is one of
trying to satisfy China's desire for state-the-art technology while supplying technology that is
appropriate to specific Chinese environments. Chinese factory managers often request the most
advanced technology from foreign firms as a matter of protocol during initial negotiations,
whether or not sufficient foreign exchange, trained personnel, or adequate infrastructure are
present to support such technology. Moreover, American firms are often pressured into offering
their most advanced technology--often displaying blueprints and conducting technical seminars--
only to see the contract go to a European or Japanese firm offering technology a decade old and
at half the price. With some notable exceptions, the reality is that the Chinese may talk quality and
sophistication but they tend to base their buying decisions on price.
Japanese, European, and US firms purse different approaches to this problem. The
Japanese have taken advantage of their proximity and historical links with China to penetrate
interior provinces and offer technology closely tied to existing Chinese capabilities at the factory
level. However, the Japanese suffer a reputation among many Chinese of not being forthcoming
with even basic technological know-how, often described as "more talk, less do." Yet Japanese
firms offer consistently lower prices and seen to be better prepared to interface their newer
technology with older equipment inside Chinese enterprises. In contrast, European firms are said
to be more willing to transfer their highest technology, and do so rapidly and straightforwardly.
They also enjoy the concessionary government financing typical in Europe. Chinese leaders have
courted European firms throughout the mid- 1980's, stepping up competition with the United
States for technology transfer projects. Lastly, the US firms have pursued a direct approach to
technology transfer, though they have been neither as flexible in sharing high technology as some
of the Europeans nor as able to offer the low prices of the Japanese firms.
A foreign firm's competitive edge in renovation projects depends on a combination of
factors. Chinese trade officials in a position to approve contracts often consider price and credit
terms more important than appropriateness, quality, and service backup. Also, technology
acquisition decisions made by enterprise directors and official decision makers are often
influenced by the place of origin of existing equipment in the importing Chinese enterprise.
The Importance of Personal Relations or 'Guanxi"
Given China's uncertain twists plus the immature institutional setting, it is hardly
surprising that reliance on people one can trust, an old Chinese cultural tendency, is paramount.
Despite the expansion of commercial laws, the key to business in China is good personal relations.
More than one manager has told of difficulties with a supplier, customer, or government agency
dissolving upon a word with friendly senior officials. A Beijing-based American manager,
emphasized "Personal relations are everything!" According to a Hong Kong businessman, "You
can't push your Chinese partner. You have to lead him, give him hints, and talk business in
personal terms."
The Emerging of Localism
Under the reform program, provinces, cities, even towns, now have the authority to close
deals. China's economy traditionally was regionally based, with largely self-contained regional
trading and distribution systems; and today, despite efforts to create national markets, inadequate
infrastructure reinforces the tendency to local self-sufficiency. Some analysts suggest China
should be regarded as eight "greater" markets: Guangdong, Shanghai, Beijing, Sichuan, the
Northeast, the Central provinces, the Northwest, and the Southeast; an analog with the European
Union--with Beijing as Brussels--is not inapt. This division is based as much on infrastructure
inadequacies as market conditions: according to some consultants, moving product from north to
south can add as much as 15% to costs (not to mention the increased overhead of staff to oversee
shipping in China's tangled transportation network). Local production and warehousing are the
only ways to serve these local markets.
7.2 What Can We Learn from Motorola?
While is difficult to formulate business success in China because there are no ground rules
here. Common belief is that people are living a case study. Nevertheless, looking at the methods
employed by foreign firms that have achieved China business successes, one can delineate some
areas of corporate capability that can be termed "formulaic." These strategic or tactical
imperatives should remain in focus during the planning, implementation, and evaluation of China
business activities. These include, but are not limited to: (a) holding ground in China, (b) leverage
technology for market access, and (c) sharing the burden of R&D.
Holding Ground in China
Some American firms enter China ventures primarily to protect and defend market share
that they assumed safely belonged to them. As a firm's competitors enter the market, the prudent
company might choose to hedge its China prospects by participating in a venture that promises to
position the company firmly within the Chinese industrial economy. In rapidly expanding numbers,
foreign corporations have found it necessary to set up collaborative or solely owned ventures in
China in order to gain critically needed leverage strength in the market. Whether the involvement
is in manufacturing, distribution, or services, these corporations have decided that the problems of
market access can best be surmounted by deepening their relationship with the Chinese through a
China venture. Unable to offer large-scale government-backed financing, or to complete with
Japanese soga sosha companies in terns of price, corporate America has begun to realize that its
most direct and sustainable avenue into the China market is one of equity investment in China-
based enterprises. This requires the transfer of technology, the sharing of management expertise,
and joint ownership. As such, many foreign firms have discovered that selling to the China market
requires venturing in the China market. Establishing a production facility in China greatly
enhances a foreign firm's marketing effort there.
Leverage Technology for Market Access
As Chinese policy-makers once announced in 1985, "the extent to which the Chinese
market can be open to Chinese-foreign joint venture and foreign enterprises in China is closely
linked with our demand for the technology [foreign firms] supply and the products they
manufacture". The China market is being opened progressively to firms that offer technology to
produce products that China (1) cannot produce at a sufficient level of quality in order to capture
world export markets and (2) cannot produce in sufficient quantity to meet domestic market
demand. Also, since successful China ventures are usually the product of a long-term evolution of
stages: direct export, nonequity corporation, equity co-production, and finally, joint venture,
offering technology that is attractive to the Chinese end-user can speed the evolution. One or
more of the approval steps can be bypassed if a firm offers technology that will assist China
reaching its specific economic objectives in a particular sector. Knowing these objectives is crucial
in attempting to tailor a firm's technology to China's needs. Foreign firms that not only
understand broad Chinese objectives and specific needs but are willing to work closely with the
Chinese end-users gain considerable advantage and possess additional leverage into the market.
As Chinese end-users relax their insistence on obtaining only state-of-the-art technology, the
quality and scope of communication and collaboration between the end-user and the foreign frm
become crucial.
Sharing the Burden of R&D
Under this investment strategy, a foreign firm usually forms a joint venture partnership
with a counterpart that possesses the in-house resources and/or government backing to share the
expense of developing a new product that it cannot afford to develop on its own because of high
cost and high risk. In China and some other Asian countries this strategy is growing in popularity
as the cost of developing technologically sophisticated products skyrockets, and without a
lessening of the inherent risk that the new product may fail in the marketplace, even with a
concerted R&D effort behind it. Also, the increasingly modular nature of global industrial systems
(in which separate parts of a complex product are developed by different countries) demands that
firms share and coordinate their technological endeavors with widely dispersed business partners.
For example, the exorbitant cost of developing new airliners has promoted Boeing to follow this
investment strategy in Japan, where it has teamed up with a consortium of Japanese companies to
share the burden of developing its 757 and 767 aircraft.
Chapter 8 Future Perspectives
8.1 Mixed Signals: Can China Become the Next "Super Power"?
Dispatches from the China business front are confusing often times. Headlines proclaim
China the world's fastest growing economy. But two-thirds of state enterprises lose money and
official forecasts see almost 270 million workers unemployed by the end of the decade of 1990's.
Personal income, based on purchasing power parity, has soared to five figures in some urban
areas--the McKinsy consulting group sees at least 16 "high potential consumer markets" emerging
throughout China, from booming Shenzhen in the south to Urumqi in China's remote far west.
But in parts of the countryside even clothing is in short supply. (Frankenstein, 1995)
Beijing has pledged to dampen an overheating economy, but highly touted austerity plans
were abandoned. Inflation, fixed asset investment, the money supply, and nominal growth rates
continue to soar while resources available to the center fall. While Chinese leaders express
commitment to economic liberalization, there are also authoritative calls for rolling back the
reforms and reimplementing plans and controls.
There is a growing commercial code, but little enforcement: pirated films, software, and
recordings flood domestic and international markets; overseas Chinese businessmen with disputes
with their mainland partners may find themselves in jail rather than in arbitration. Foreign business
people report different encounters, from cooperation and success to blockage, corruption, and
fraud.
Despite these mixed signals, its difficult to travel in China and not come away with
positive feelings. The great variety of experience can be summed up in a phrase: Everything you
hear about China is true, but none of it is reliable.
But if we understand the Beijing's rules and operations mechanism, then we can plot our
activities in China's strategic space.
Essentially, China would like to emulate the modernization programs of both Japan and
Taiwan as it seeks to reach a point of near technological equality with the West, the programs that
involve the acquisition and subsequent improvement of foreign technological products, only later
to reintroduce them on the international market as competing export commodities. Whether they
can remold foreign technology with the same success as Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and South
Korea is difficult to predict. Certainly, many more obstacles block China's path to modernization
than other Asian nations experienced.
Internally, Chinese leaders have found it virtually impossible to encourage exports without
drastically restructuring the Chinese economy. One aspect of China's development that will slow
down the development of competitive technology exports is the absence of both a marketplace for
high-technology products and a competitive private sector. Externally, China's objective to catch
up to the West meets additional obstacles.
However, one of the ironies of Chinese technological modernization is that the country
has developed a nuclear weapons industry, put 18 satellites into space, and has launched a ballistic
missile from a submarine despite their problems in implementing civilian technology. They have
been able to do this largely because their centralized system can concentrate its best-educated
scientists and most advanced resources on high-priority projects. In many fields of technology, the
gap between China and the industrialized nations is being closed, and this disturbs many US
policy-makers. Indeed, China developed its first computer in 1958, only twelve years after the
United States, and only one year after Japan. It developed its first integrated circuit in 1969,
eleven years after the United States and only one year after England. Finally, China possessed its
own hydrogen bomb by 1967, fifteen years after the United States, and one year before France.
Indeed, China is trouble. Its political system is unclear and plagued by corruption, its
booming economy us perilously brittle. The people show little respect for copyrights. For all those
drawbacks, however, China is proving irresistibly attractive to the world's most advanced
technology companies.
What's drawing Motorola and the rest of these all-stars is the prospect of an enormous
shift in the high-tech world's center of gravity? Sometime in the early 21st century, many are
betting, China will emerge as the world' largest consumer of electronics products--everything
from PCs and TVs to microwave ovens and telephones. It may also become a major competitor
for the electronics industry's Japanese, European, and American powers that be.
In the end, of course, China's place in the global high-tech hierarchy will depend on its
ability to restructure its inefficient economy. But it also hinges in no small part on the size and
nature of the investments made by the foreign powerhouses now hurrying into this promising but
risky new territory--Motorola foremost among them. How's this for impact? By popularizing the
cellular phone in China, where it is now a market leader, Motorola is helping the Chinese leapfrog
one particular stage of industrial evolution for which Western nations have had to pony up many
billion dollars--the need to tie every home and business together with copper wire.
8.2 Challenges and Problems: Motorola Investing for Long Haul
Mention Motorola, the company that almost everyone loves to love and the accolades
fairly gush: titan of TQM, epitome of empowerment, tribune of training, icon of innovation, and
prince of profits. The foremost wireless communications provider in the world, it is so ubiquitous
that in China people simply say Motorola when they mean cellular phone. At issue now is whether
Motorola can keep getting as it keeps getting bigger, whether this huge, decentralized,
multinational corporation can avoid falling victim to the bureaucracy, complacency, and hubris
that have afflicted so many other American businesses. In particular, in China market, can
Motorola maintain its competitive advantages with new challenges and problems.
Worldwide, Motorola's more pressing problem may be convincing shareholders that
investing an additional half a billion dollars in a developing nation plagued by widespread
corruption, social dislocation, a patchy legal structure, and an opaque political process is a great
idea. It's even harder to sell at a time when the semiconductor industry has a lot of capacity, and
there are persistent fears that the growth of the PC business, a crucial customer for chips, is
slowing down. Already, the global capital-spending budget is being scaled back in Motorola's
semiconductor division, and plans for a new chip plant outside Richmond, Virginia, have been
pushed back a year.
Now, in China, changing tax rules, inflation and competition from Motorola products
being smuggled into China are bleeding the company. With competition rising and problems
cropping up on several fronts, investors are starting to ask if Motorola has its fingers in too many
pies. Indeed, Motorola faces tough challenges and problems, especially the increasing costs and
labor problems.
In Tianjin, Motorola's major manufacturing base in China, where the company hires most
of its six thousand employees to date, entry-level jobs on the assembly line pay a competitive US$
125 a month per worker. Motorola sweetens the deal with an innovative home-ownership policy
aimed at retaining the workers it trains. But pressure to raise wages keeps increasing. The
company has handed out two wage rises in 1993, so that the total compensation package for
production workers, including transport costs, is now about 850 yuan or US$ 98 a month. Rates
are determined by surveying what other firms in the area paying and then trying to keep Motorola
at the head of these rates. Motorola is drawing its new staff--nearly 90% of whom are women--
mainly from a pool of schools around Tianjin. But because of the zone's location--50 kilometers
east of the city proper--staff have to be busses in at a cost of US$ 40 per employee per month--
the equivalent of around two-thirds of their basic pay.(Business China, 1994)
Accommodation near the plant in a "Motorola village" is being planned for expatriate
staff, about 60 by the mid-19995 and ultimately to 100. Now, most commute for one-hour from
the Tianjin International Building in central Tianjin, where rents for a two-room apartment are
US$ 7,000 a month. Motorola also opened an international school for the children of its expat
staff in 1994.
The company has a roughly 16-strong employee service committee which handles most
employment-related issues, but not wages. Layoffs, of course, are never easy in a country where
the concept of the "iron rice bowl"--cradle-to-grave welfare benefits and lifetime employment--is
still strong. How would Motorola lay off and move out an unproductive engineer already
comfortably ensconced in a home? After all attempts to retrain the deadbeat had been exhausted,
the company insists it would nullify the mortgage, compensate the engineer and his family for
paid-in principal, and show them the door. The plant has no union, nut the main issue at stake
appeared to be communist party representation in factories--the company is allowing party
meetings to be held on its premises.
Nevertheless, Motorola figures that high costs today will add up to advantage tomorrow.
Certainly, CEO Tooker believes that China deserves the large place it now holds in Motorola's
future. "I think people who have invested in Motorola over the years understand that we maybe
have a longer-term view than some of our competitors."
8.3 Cooperation with Competition: Toward Mutual Benefits
Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd. was set up with the vision to be a added partner in
modernizing China by providing leadership in creating a conductive business environment for
Motorola China to grow beyond.
Regardless all of the challenges and problems faced with both Motorola and China, it is
believed that the future of the cooperation of both sides is optimistic. This is based on the belief
that cooperation, with competition, will help both sides achieve a win-win success and mutual
benefits. A brief summary of Motorola's China practices in its manufacturing, R&D, organization
setting and people development in the recent years illustrates the initial outcomes achieved by
both sides.
Motorola and China's cooperation has been basically in tow business lines, one in low-end
production and the other in high-end technology development. The collaborative activities and
organizational structure also vary depends on the different product/technology lines of Motorola
and industry sectors of China.
Paging Products and Technology
Motorola's biggest business line in China, paging, has been developed over time from
merely manufacturing simple products to providing technical supporting and services and finally
to developing its own R&D capacity for the local market.
Motorola organizes its businesses in Greater China region with different functions, as
shown in the following chart:
Sales and Marketing Service Center Manufacturing R&D Technology Support
USA
Beijing Beijing Beijing
Tianjin
Shanghai
Guanhzhou
Taipei Taipei
Hong Kong
Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore
Headquartered in Singapore, with offices throughout Asia Pacific, the Asia Pacific Paging
Subscriber Division, is a select team of sales, service and technical professional focused
exclusively on customers in the region. While focused in Asia Pacific, Motorola is structured to
ensure that customers benefit from its experience and resources both in the region and around the
world. This allows Motorola to assemble a customized team of professionals with the specific
technological and market knowledge needed to provide solutions to its customers' individual
needs.
Motorola's commitment to making paging systems and products the finest in the world
means it invests heavily in research and development. To be closer to its customers, the Singapore
Design Center was established in 1983. The Center has a team of engineers and designers
dedicated to paging products. The team works with their counterparts in the United States
researching and developing new paging products for Asia Pacific and the world. The Motorola
Confidant and Scriptor LX2 pagers are a result of the Singapore team's development efforts.
After about ten year-development in Singapore, Motorola has been now able to transfer
the Asia expertise to China, by establishing research and development facilities in Beijing which
support all the China manufacturing and services.
Motorola China Paging Subscriber Division started its building of technical capacity, with
the establishment of a R&D entity-China Design Center, located in Beijing in 1994. Equipped
with the most advanced instruments from Motorola, the center has a mission to gradually develop
R&D expertise to fully support Motorola's China paging business, though currently the research
work in Beijing are basically secondary based on the technology developed in the US and
Singapore where Motorola started its Asia exposure more than a decade ago. Among the twenty-
to thirty- work force, most of them are local technical professional, under the guidance of three to
four expatriates from US, Singapore and Hong Kong. Local professionals are recruited from
university graduates and people who have a few years work experience after graduation form
school, most of them have master's or Ph.D. degree.
Semiconductor and Related Technology Development
Toward achieving "Total Customer Satisfaction", Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd.'s
Semiconductor Products Sector (SPS) has set up offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and
Tianjin to provide its products and services to its customers, Supported by Hong Kong R&D
capacities. SPS is committed to growing with the China electronics industry and to maximizing
semiconductor market share in China.
In the early period of Motorola's China operations, SPS served as a representative sales
office for Motorola Semiconductors Hong Kong Ltd. It also promotes the computer, consumer,
automotive, industrial and telecommunications with a broad line of discrete semiconductors and
integrated circuits in the China market. Gradually, SPS has made achievements in help China
building its semiconductor industry. The major steps including the following:
1. The Tianjin Manufacturing Plant in TEDA was competed and fully operational in 1993.
2. In 1995, an agreement was signed with Leshan Radio Co. Ltd. for a joint venture Leshan
Phoenix Semiconductor Co. Ltd.
3. Also, in 1995, Motorola expanded investment of US$ 720 million to construct Wafer Fab and
equipment manufacturing facility (dubbed MOS 17) in the Xi Qing Economic Development Zone
at Tianjin. It will be completed in 1998 within the "Nine Five-year Plan". MOS 17 is the most
funded and fully equipped submicron project in China now, making Beijing-Tianjin the submicron
base, also known as "China's Silicon Valley".
4. In accordance with the "University Support Program", SPS has established MCU Application
Centers with Tsinghua, Fudan and Guandong Poly Technology University, SPS, built a Joint
Development Lab with Chinese Academy of Science and donated EVM and Motorola SPS
products Databook to 38 universities. SPS also organized HC11 & HC05 MCU Design Proposal
contests joined by students and researchers.
Due to high demand of desktop computers and workstations in the computer market, in
the Q4 of 1993, IBM, APPLE and Motorola have joined together to develop the new product of
PowerPC-PowerPC 604. PowerPC is designed by the three electronic giants at the design center
in Austin Somerrest. The production sites of PowerPC are IBM Burlington Vts semiconductor
Ltd and Motorola TX. PowerPC is suitable for the use of portable computer, desktop computer,
workstation and servo control.
A Joint Development Laboratory for Advanced Computer and Communication
Technologies (JDL), founded in Beijing on January 1, 1996, is a joint venture between Motorola
Inc. and the National Research Center for Intelligent Computing System (NCIC). The laboratory
engages in joint research and development efforts on advanced computer and communication
technologies based on Motorola's semiconductor architectures and the latest science
achievements produced by the State 863 Hi-tech Project. According to the agreement, all
prototype systems and associated intellectual property rights are equally shared by the two parties.
The Steering Committee has eight members, four from Motorola and four from NCIC.
Currently, the laboratory has 20 engineers, 10 from Software Center, Motorola China,
specializing in signal processing, intonation recognition, computer graphics, man machine
interface and tone frequency technology, and computer telecommunications technology. Motorola
people include Motorola corporate VP and President of Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd.,
Corporate VP and Assistant General Manager of Asia Pacific Semiconductor Group
headquartered in Hong Kong, VP and Director of External Technology Planning for Motorola
Corporate Office in Schaumburg, Illinois and Managing Director of Wireless Systems Center,
Sector Technology, Motorola Semiconductor Products Sector in Austin, Texas, Chairman of the
JDL Steering Committee.
Shanghai Motorola Automotive Electronics Co., Ltd., located in Pudong Development
Area and founded in March 1996, Shanghai, China. This joint venture was established between
the Automotive and Industrial Electronics Group (AIEG) of Motorola and Shanghai
Instrumentation Group Corporation (SIC).
Motorola AIEG, a business unit of Automotive, Energy and Controls Group (AECG), is
one of the largest, leading and independent suppliers of advanced automotive electronics products
in the world. AIEG's strengths are the design of custom electronic solutions that match customer
needs, including high quality, high volume manufacturing; application knowledge and engineering
expertise; efficient management processes; and a customer oriented culture.
SIC, a corporation directly under the Shanghai Instrument and Electronic Industry
Bureau, is a leading industrial corporation in China focused on development, manufacturing and
marketing of various products for instrumentation systems, office automation, computer
peripherals, and electric appliances. Currently, SIC was assigned by the Shanghai Municipal
Government to develop automotive electronics in support of the rapid growing automotive
industry in China.
By establishing this JV, SIC will elevate its level of technology development as well as
acquire necessary technologies and skills to compete in the automotive market; and AIEG will
expand cooperation with several automotive OEMs and systems suppliers, which are strategic
partners with AIEG in the US and Europe. In addition, this JV will foster electronic component
localization and select product export on a global basis.
Having received the broadest possible business charter allowed by the Shanghai
government, SMAE will engage in the design, application, manufacturing, sales and technical
support for automotive electronics products including electronics control units for electronic fuel
injection systems (EFI), anti-lock braking systems (ABS), electronically controlled suspension
systems, electronically assisted steering systems, in vehicle communication and navigation
systems, body electronics and sensors.
In keeping with the terms of the agreement, SMAE will adopt all key Motorola
management practices such as Motorola Code of Conduct, Advanced quality Control System,
Continuing Cycle Time Reduction, and Enhanced Training Program, to ensure Motorola's
fundamental objective: Total Customer Satisfaction.
It is believed that, with all these joint efforts made by both China and USA, Motorola's
China operations will become an integrated elements in China's modernization process. It is the
common desire of Motorola and China that Motorola (China) will become a Chinese domestic
and international oriented, first class and independent electronics and telecommunications pioneer
and the key force in the rapid growth and development of modern industry in China.
Conclusions
Those foreign firms offering the technology that will assist China in accomplishing its
national strategic objectives are finding the market remarkably accessible. While this may sound
like a rather simplistic quid pro quo, it is not as easy to accomplish as it may appear. Many foreign
firms lack the necessary preparation to assist China in assimilating technologies or to correctly
assess China's exact technological needs. Others simply lack adequate incentives to do so.
China has targeted world markets for its export goods through a program which develops
export manufacturing based on imported technology, equipment, and managerial expertise.
Import decision makers place high priority on acquiring the most advanced technology available in
order to endure product exportability and prevent rapid obsolescence. Areas of emphasis include
telecommunications, electronics, and computers, and other projects likely to promote high-tech
industries and exports, reduce energy consumption, and lessen China's dependency on imports.
For the time being, Motorola has a competitive edge over foreign telecom and electronics
manufacturers. It holds a technological edge particularly in wireless telecommunications. The
ultimate competitor to the US telecommunications industry in the future, however, will not speak
French, or Japanese, or German, but Chinese. "By the turn of the century, the big question will
not be China as a military threat to the US but China as major economic competitor" Says
William Archey, Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International trade.'"
By including technical data transfer and training course in most foreign contracts, the
Chinese intend to master what they purchase. In time they will be able to manufacture System 12
switches themselves, create variations on the IBM PC, and roll out AMC trucks to sell
internationally. With no R&D costs to cover, and low labor costs, China may take the edge away
from the West's industry front-runners. The contest will be especially fierce in the emerging Third
World markets where the nascent technological base does not require sophisticated, expensive or
compatible equipment.
Nevertheless, the China market is becoming increasingly important as the US trade deficits
demand export promotion and as the American economy moves towards a high tech base. While
American technology is preferred by the Chinese now, international competition in China is
growing due to similar economic tends in other industrialized countries. The sales to China
10 See "Capitalism in China" Business Week. January 14, 1984: 54.
currently help American industry, but may pose the challenge of competition from China in the
future.
Of course, thus far, filled with the Chinese business environment--the political and
economic context in which it operates--is still the uncertainty regarding its future. It is well and
good to talk of being in China for the long term, but plans in the face of other outcomes should be
prepared.
No one doubts that participating in China's investment opportunities entails great risks.
However, as is well known to all, the higher the risks, the more the possible opportunities. The
general business environment in China does shape the opportunities available to firms there,
opportunities for those foreign firms who not only access the Chinese market through technology
transfer and show a longer term commitment to enhancing China's technical base, but also for
those who develop R&D capacity within China so that the technology transfer could eventually be
in two directions--As Motorolaians are all quick to remind you, they are in this game-playing with
the Chinese for the long haul: to achieve a win-win success in the emerging high-tech world.
Appendix 1.
The 12 US Companies with the Biggest Stakes in China
(In total dollars spent or committed to be spent by the end of 1996)
Motorola: $1.2 billion. The company's most recent commitments include several joint ventures and a $560
million semiconductor wafer fabrication plant in Tianjin.
Atlantic Richfield: $625 million. Arco has completed China's largest offshore natural gas project, a 41.13
billion pipeline half owned by the Chinese government.
Coca-Cola: $500 million. Coke, Fanta, Sprite, and Hi C are bottled at 16 locations. Seven more facilities
are being constructed.
AMOCO: $350 million. Amoco started producing oil in March from a development project in the South
China Sea.
Ford Motor: $250 million. Ford has three factories making auto components, light trucks and vans; two
other plants are under construction.
United Technologies: $250 million. UT's Otis subsidiary makes elevators and escalators; Carrier
manufactures air-conditioning equipment.
PepsiCo: $200 million. Pepsi has 12 bottling plants, two joint ventures producing Cheetos, 62 KFC
franchises, and 19 Pizza huts.
Lucent Technologies: 4150 million. The AT&T spin-off is involved in seven joint ventures, including a
$70 million project to provide digital private-line service to Beijing.
General Electric: $150 million. GE is part of 14 joint ventures, including those that make X-ray and other
medical systems; it owns 80% of the largest lighting manufacturer in China.
General Motors: $130 million. Delphi, a subsidiary, is a partner in three auto-parts facilities. Not counted,
because the money is not yet committed, is GM's 50% partnership in a $1 billion project to build cars in
Shanghai.
Hewlett-Packard: $100 million. HP has been investing in China for 12 years and now manufactures
computers, medical systems products and analytical chemical equipment.
IBM: $100 million. IBM has six joint ventures, producing computers, electronic cards, advanced
workstations for the banking industry and software.
Source: Schoenberger, Karl. 1996. "Motorola Bets Big on China". Fortune May 27, 1996:116-124.
Appendix 2.
Wallet Card Carried by all Motorola (Asia) Employees
Our Fundamental Objective
(Everyone's Overriding Responsibility)
Total Customer Satisfaction
Key Beliefs: How we will always act --
" Constant respect for People
e Uncompromising Integrity
Key Goals: What we must accomplish --
" Best in Class
e People
e Marketing
e technology
e Products
e Manufacturing
e Service
e Increased Global Market Share
e Superior Financial Results
Key Initiatives: How we will do it --
" Six Sigma Quality
e Total Cycle Time Reduction
e Product, manufacturing and Environmental Leadership
" Profit Improvement
" Empowerment for all in a Participative, cooperative, and
Creative Workplace.
Source: Gogan, L. Janis. 1994. "Motorola: Institutionalizing Corporate Initiatives". Harvard
Business School Case 9-494-139. October 20, 1994.
Appendix 3.
Market information of new generations of hand-portable analog cellular terminals., and the
terminal's most important performance parameter (weight), by the major competitors
between 1983 and 1992.
Unit: gram
Motorola 6300 800a - _ - 303/350 - 2 2 0 /2 7 0b 17 0 / 19 3b
Ericsson - 7000 5800 - 900 - 420 - - 330
Nokai- - 5000 - 790 - 680 - 470 - 280
Mobira
NEC - 7200 3800 - 650 - - 400 - 220
Hitachi - - - - 600 - - - - 270
Panasonic - 7300 - - 3100 - - 380 - -
a This model introduced by Motorola was the first cellular which was a handset. The previous models were portable car cellular
telephones.
b These products were introduced by Motorola with two different batteries. With the larger battery, the operating time became
the longest in the industry in comparison with the competitors' products
Source: Oskarsson, Christer. and Niklas Sjoberg. 1994. "Technology Analysis and Competitive Strategy: The case of Mobile
telephones". Technology Analysis & Strategic management, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1994: 12.
Appendix 4
Patents granted in the US between 1979 and 1988 in semiconductors
telecommunications (three-digit level) for major competitors.
Matsushita Hitachi Motorola
Semiconductors
1979-1981
1982-1984
1985-1987
1988
Sum 1979-1988
Telecommunications
1979-1981
1982-1984
1985-1987
1988
Sum 1979-1988
126
100
176
66
468
85
130
227
92
534
115
150
226
62
553
Toshiba NEC
111
186
337
105
739
60
75
127
47
309
Elaboration on data supplied to the science Policy Research Unit, Sessex, by the US Department of Trade and Commerce,
Patent and Trade mark Office. The data are granted patents in US between 1979 and 1988 on the three-digit level.
Source: Oskarsson, Christer. and Niklas Sjoberg. 1994. "Technology Analysis and Competitive Strategy: The case of Mobile
telephones". Technology Analysis & Strategic management, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1994: 15.
and
Ericsson
2
3
1
0
6
55
45
132
58
290
56
81
191
72
400
Appendix 5
Patents granted in Europe for cellular terminal sub-technologies between 1979 and 1990 for
the four major competitors.
Ericsson Nokia-Mobira Motorola
Battery technology
1979-1981
1982-1984
1985-1987
1988-1990
Sum 1979-1990
Analogue radio technology
1979-1981
1982-1984
1985-1987
1988-1990
Sum 1979-1990
Liquid display technology'
1979-1981
1982-1984
1985-1987
1988-1990
Sum 1979-1990
Analogue signal processing
1979-1981
1982-1984
1985-1987
1988-1990
Sum 1979-1990
Analogue VLSI design (for radio applications)e
1979-1981
1982-1984
1985-1987
1988-1990
Sum 1979-1990
VLSI production (for relevant VLSIs)f
1979-1981
1982-1984
1985-1987
1988-1990
Sum 1979-1990
Assembly technology and DFMA
NEC
0
0
3
7
10
43
153
221
244
661
4
4
9
10
27
23
72
81
128
304
2
10
12
25
3
11
20
46
80
1979-1981 1 0 8 1
1982-1984 1 0 15 11
1985-1987 0 1 6 27
1988-1990 1 4 25 13
Sum 1979-1990 3 5 54 52
The table is complied from patenting in Europe on the six-digit IPC patent classification. Patents filed and granted in Europe.
The data were supplied by the Swedish Patent Office.
aIPC patent classes*: G05f, G08B, GO9G, HOlM, HO2J, HO4B, HO4M.
b IPC patent classes*: C04B, COR, COIS, G08B, GI IC, G02F, G05F, GO56F, GIOL, HOlL -> H04Q.
' IPC patent classes*: G02F, G06F, G06K, GO9F, H04M.
d IPC patent classes*: C04B, GOIR, G06K, GO9F, GO9G, H04M.
* IPC patent classes*: G05F, GO6K, HOlL.
IPC patent classes*: G23K, C23F, HOlL, H05K.
9 IPC classes*: B23K, B32B, HOlL, H05K.
* certain patent subgroups on six-digital level within the following four-digit patent groups.
Source: Oskarsson, Christer. and Niklas Sjoberg. 1994. "Technology Analysis and Competitive Strategy: The case of Mobile telephones". Technology
Analysis & Strategic management, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1994: 14.
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